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[|| Since the beginning of August, China’s solar cell market has staged a sharp reversal. TOPCon cell prices bottomed out in late July and rebounded rapidly. Compared with the lows seen from late July to early August, mainstream prices as of August 18 had risen by more than 20% across major formats, with gains in some specifications approaching 30%. The rally was initially supported by a rising cost floor. Since mid-August, however, the pace of price increases has clearly exceeded what can be explained by cost recovery alone. Following the rollout of the U.S. Section 232 measures, expectations for front-loaded procurement across supply chains serving the U.S. market have intensified. Traders have increasingly become marginal buyers of higher-priced cells, further amplifying gains in the spot market. In contrast, domestic module manufacturers remain reluctant to accept current high cell prices. This means that while the market is being supported by the policy window and export-related stockpiling, whether the rally can evolve from a short-term move into a more sustainable uptrend will ultimately depend on whether higher cell costs can be passed through to module prices and whether domestic demand can take over once the policy-driven export window begins to close. Current Market: Cost Recovery Sets the Floor, Export Stockpiling Amplifies the Rally The market began to reverse rapidly in August. According to SMM data, as of August 18, mainstream price ranges for TOPCon G12R, M10 and G12 cells had risen to RMB 0.316-0.367/W, RMB 0.316-0.367/W and RMB 0.319-0.352/W, respectively. Offers for some G12R and M10 cells briefly reached around RMB 0.38/W. Costs provided the initial foundation for the rebound. Since late July, stronger expectations for higher polysilicon prices, a rapid recovery in wafer prices, and rising costs for silver paste and other auxiliary materials have jointly lifted the cost floor for solar cells and strengthened producers’ willingness to hold firm on offers. However, cost movements can largely explain why prices were able to rebound from low levels; they do not fully explain the pace of gains since mid-August. The stronger driver behind the acceleration has been rapidly rising expectations for advance procurement following the rollout of the U.S. Section 232 measures. On August 6, the United States formally announced Section 232 measures covering polysilicon and its derivatives. The measures set minimum import prices of $0.22/W for solar cells and $0.38/W for solar modules. They will take effect at 12:01 a.m. U.S. Eastern Time on December 4, 2026, for covered products entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption. Certain polysilicon derivatives listed in the announcement will also be subject to additional ad valorem duties. The transition period between the announcement and implementation has prompted front-loaded procurement and inventory building across the Asian solar supply chain serving the U.S. market. Based on current transaction patterns, this incremental demand is becoming an increasingly important marginal driver in the spot market. According to feedback from supply-chain traders surveyed by SMM, the market could see around 15-20 GW of solar cell stockpiling demand during the policy window, with traders also emerging as key buyers of some higher-priced material. It is important to stress that the 15-20 GW figure remains an industry survey estimate and market expectation. It does not represent volumes that have already been contracted, prepaid, assigned shipping schedules or exported. Only if a substantial portion of this expected demand is ultimately converted into actual purchase orders will it materially affect near-term cell shipment flows and spot inventories. Module Makers: Domestic Demand May Take Over, but Acceptance of High Cell Prices Remains Limited Compared with traders, domestic module manufacturers remain cautious about purchasing high-priced cells. On the one hand, domestic project demand is expected to improve in Q4, which could support a sequential recovery in module production schedules and cell procurement. On the other hand, module producers remain constrained by end-market tender prices, project returns and their own inventory positions. At present, module makers generally view RMB 0.33-0.35/W as a more acceptable procurement range for solar cells. In terms of cost pass-through, solar cells have responded relatively quickly in the current round of price increases, but whether module prices can rise in tandem remains uncertain. If module selling prices fail to absorb the increase in cell costs, module producers are more likely to delay procurement, reduce safety inventories, prioritize internally produced cells or adjust production schedules rather than continue chasing higher-priced external supply. This is likely to lead to greater market segmentation. Cell producers with well-secured export orders may be able to maintain firmer offers, while standard domestic orders and more abundantly supplied formats may remain subject to pricing pressure from module makers. As a result, the current rally is more likely to remain structural rather than develop into a synchronized increase across all formats and all producers. Why Could Mid-October Become a Key Turning Point? It is worth noting that the Section 232 measures do not provide an unrestricted window for imports ahead of implementation. The U.S. presidential proclamation also states that if the Secretary of Commerce determines that a company has stockpiled polysilicon or its derivatives before the measures take effect, the department may coordinate with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to impose import restrictions. Advance procurement by traders therefore should not be viewed as risk-free front-loading. How U.S. authorities distinguish between normal inventory preparation and policy-avoidance stockpiling, as well as how strictly the provision is ultimately enforced, could also affect actual shipment flows. The Section 232 measures are scheduled to take effect on December 4, 2026. According to trader feedback, arranging shipments from China or other major Asian production hubs, completing ocean freight and clearing U.S. customs generally requires at least around 40-45 days. Working backward from the implementation date, shipments intended to enter the U.S. before the new measures take effect may therefore need to depart by around mid-October to provide a more comfortable logistics buffer. From a procurement perspective, the closer the market gets to mid-October, the less time remains to arrange new export orders, which could gradually reduce traders’ willingness to chase higher prices. Assuming no major changes in logistics conditions, trader purchasing patterns or subsequent U.S. implementation rules, the market could follow a baseline pattern in which export-related stockpiling continues to support orders and prices through August and September. As the available shipping window narrows and compliance risks rise in October, new inquiries may gradually decline. If incremental export procurement weakens materially by mid- to late October, domestic module producers could once again become more influential in setting solar cell prices. Q4 Outlook: Domestic Demand May Provide a Floor, but Correction Risks Rise After October From a supply-demand perspective, the solar cell market could see two distinct phases of demand in Q4. The first phase is concentrated procurement linked to front-loaded exports. Such orders tend to be released quickly and are highly sensitive to delivery timing. Traders may be willing to pay a certain premium to secure product within the available policy window, helping reduce inventories at cell producers and providing continued support to prices. The second phase would depend more heavily on domestic demand. Q4 project deliveries could lift module production schedules and, in theory, increase solar cell consumption. However, domestic module producers are much more cost-sensitive than traders purchasing against a time-limited export window. Their procurement is more closely tied to immediate production needs, and they are less willing to absorb elevated prices. In other words, stronger domestic demand could provide downside support, but may not be sufficient to sustain the high prices created during the export-driven procurement window. Based on this logic, SMM expects solar cell prices to remain relatively firm through August and September, while upward momentum could gradually weaken after entering October. If new export orders begin to decline from early October while module producers continue to resist higher prices, the probability of a downward shift in transaction prices will increase in mid- to late October. The scale of any correction will depend on the actual volume purchased by traders, incremental production at cell manufacturers and the strength of domestic module demand. At the same time, if a substantial portion of the expected 15-20 GW of stockpiling demand is converted into trader purchases but downstream consumption ultimately lags the pace of earlier inventory building, stock pressure could increase once the policy window closes. If part of the material remains in trader inventories or overseas warehouses, subsequent channel restocking demand may effectively have been pulled forward, potentially weakening export orders further in November and December. Three Indicators to Watch First, changes in the volume and pricing of solar cell purchases by module manufacturers. If higher-priced transactions remain concentrated among traders while module makers continue to procure only on a low-inventory, just-in-time basis, the rally will still lack sustained downstream support. Second, cell producer inventories and production schedules. If manufacturers rapidly increase output in response to stronger export orders, but the additional production encounters weaker export demand after October, inventories could begin building again and amplify downward price pressure. Third, order divergence among different cell formats. High-efficiency products and formats better suited to export demand may remain relatively firm, while more abundantly supplied products primarily serving the domestic market could feel pricing pressure from module makers earlier. Overall, the impact of the current Section 232-driven market on China’s solar cell sector can be summarized as “near-term export-led destocking, a shift in demand drivers around October, and a return to domestic fundamentals in Q4.” With traders still driving a significant share of high-priced procurement and module producers yet to broadly accept current cell prices, the rally remains clearly cyclical and structural in nature. As the front-loading window narrows after mid-October, the risk of a correction in solar cell prices is likely to rise materially. ||]

글로벌 리튬이온 배터리 제조 지형은 수요 주도의 생산능력 재배분이라는 뚜렷한 패턴을 보이고 있다. 구조적 이전이라기보다, 정책 인센티브, 수요 사이클, 그리고 각 세그먼트의 상이한 경제성에 의해 에너지저장시스템(ESS)과 전기차(EV) 구동용 배터리 간 생산 전환이 유연하게 이뤄지고 있다. 2025년 전 세계 리튬이온 배터리 생산량은 2,100GWh를 넘어섰으며, 이 중 동력 배터리는 1,500GWh에 근접했고 ESS 배터리 생산은 약 550GWh 수준이었다. 2026년에는 전체 리튬 배터리 생산이 전년 대비 약 56% 증가해 3,300GWh를 상회할 것으로 전망되며, ESS용 리튬 배터리 생산은 1,000GWh를 넘어설 것으로 예상된다. 이처럼 빠르게 확대되는 시장에서 생산능력은 고정돼 있지 않으며, 정책 시행 창구와 규제 마감 시한이 촉발하는 단발성 수요 펄스에 반응해 세그먼트 간 이동한다. 전환 동인과 타임라인 2025~2026년에 관측된 생산능력 전환 패턴은 정책 창구, 규제 마감, 세그먼트별 급증 등 단발성 수요 신호에 의해 좌우된다. 2025년 2~3분기: ESS → 전기 상용차 전환 글로벌 상용차 시장에서 수요가 급증하며 2025년 신에너지 상용차 판매가 100만 대에 근접했다. 이는 전년 대비 약 60% 증가이며 시장 침투율은 약 4분의 1 수준이다. 이 가운데 신에너지 대형 트럭은 폭발적으로 성장했다. 전액 구매세 면제 정책과 맞물리며, 이러한 수요 급증은 ESS 생산능력을 상용차용 동력 배터리로 전환시키는 계기가 됐다. 2025년 4분기: 전기 상용차 → ESS 역전환 연말 에너지저장 프로젝트의 집중 인도 창구(주로 중국의 연간 계통연계 마감 시한에 의해 촉발)가 형성되면서 생산능력이 다시 ESS로 회귀했다. 2026년 상반기: 에너지저장 인도 지속 + 가정용 ESS 전환 2026년 상반기에는 저장 프로젝트 인도가 지속되는 한편, 전기 상용차 수요는 소폭 둔화됐다. 동시에 중국 외 지역의 가정용 ESS 수요가 일부 시장의 인센티브에 힘입어 회복했는데, 특히 호주가 두드러지며 일부 동력용 생산능력이 가정용 저장 세그먼트로 이동했다. 무엇이 전환됐고, 비용은 얼마였나 생산능력 재배분은 서로 다른 셀 모델이 관여하는 두 가지 경로로 작동했다. 경로 1: 동력 배터리 내 대형 셀 전환(324Ah & 588Ah). 주로 324Ah와 588Ah의 대형 포맷 셀은 상용차와 승용차 동력 배터리 라인 사이를 이동한다. 상용차 수요가 급증할 때(2025년 대형 트럭처럼) 해당 라인은 더 큰 물량의 승용차 세그먼트를 위해 재목적화될 수 있으며, 반대로도 가능하다. 두 용도 모두 동력 배터리 영역에 속하므로 세그먼트 내 전환이다. 경로 2: 동력→ESS 라인 전환(120Ah). 120Ah의 소형 셀은 동력과 에너지저장 응용의 경계에 위치한다. 120Ah 셀을 생산하는 라인은 어느 세그먼트가 단기적으로 더 나은 경제성을 제공하는지에 따라 동력 배터리용에서 ESS용으로 전환되거나, 다시 되돌릴 수 있다. 이는 배터리 시장의 두 축을 연결하는 세그먼트 간 전환이다. 전환 비용과 리드타임: 평균적으로 생산 라인을 다른 셀 모델로 전환하기 위한 개조에는 2~4주가 소요되며, 전환 1회당 비용은 약 14만 달러 수준이다. 이는 생산능력 재배분을 연속적인 흐름이 아니라 신중한 의사결정으로 만드는 기본 마찰이며, 다음 절에서 설명하듯 공정 기술이 결정적으로 중요해지는 이유다. 공정 기술이 전환 유연성을 결정한다 모든 생산 라인이 동일한 용이성으로 전환할 수 있는 것은 아니다. 기저의 셀 제조 공정이 생산능력 재배분의 탄력성을 규정한다. 권취 공정: 이 방식에서는 전극을 권취 니들에 감는다. 니들 길이와 곡률 반경이라는 물리적 제약으로 인해 생산 가능한 셀 모델이 고정된다. 다른 모델로 전환하려면 권취 니들을 교체해야 하며, 높은 개조 비용과 긴 리드타임이 발생한다. 그 결과 324Ah 권취 라인은 동일 모델의 ESS와 상용차용 동력 셀 사이에서만 전환이 가능하다. 적층 공정: 전극과 분리막을 층층이 적층하며, 권취 니들과 반경 제약에서 자유롭다. 전극 길이와 적층 층수를 조정하면 적층 라인은 어떤 용량의 셀도 생산할 수 있다. 이는 모든 셀 모델 간 유연한 전환을 가능하게 한다. BYD는 대규모 적층 생산능력을 보유한 대표 업체로, 블레이드 배터리 라인업은 전량 적층 공정으로 생산된다. 전환 방향 셀 유형 / 공정 공정 특성 ESS ⇄ 상용차 324Ah(권취) 권취 만드렐 크기에 의해 제한; 동일 모델 생산 라인은 양방향 전환 가능 ESS ⇄ 상용차 적층, 모델 비특정 만드렐/곡률 제약 없음; 전극-층수 자유 조정, 모든 셀 모델 간 유연 전환 동력 ⇄ 가정용 저장 120Ah 가정용 저장 셀 보조금 극대화를 위해 동력 셀 생산능력을 가정용 저장으로 전환 결론 리튬이온 배터리 산업이 에너지저장과 EV 동력 세그먼트 사이에서 생산능력을 유연하게 재배분할 수 있다는 점은 제조 기반의 규모와 공급망의 대응력을 동시에 반영한다. 2026년 ESS용 리튬이온 배터리 생산이 전년 대비 90% 이상 증가할 것으로 전망되는 등 에너지저장이 빠르게 부상하고, 상용차 전동화가 지속적으로 가속되는 가운데, 이러한 수요 주도 전환 역학은 앞으로도 이어질 가능성이 크다. 다만 유연성의 정도는 공정 기술에 따라 크게 달라진다. BYD처럼 적층 기반 제조사는 최소한의 마찰로 수요 변화에 대응할 수 있는 반면, 권취 기반 업체는 더 높은 전환 비용과 제한된 선택지를 감수해야 한다.

2026년 상반기, 전고체 배터리 공급망 상장사들의 실적은 뚜렷한 양극화를 보였다. 전통 리튬 배터리 소재 공급업체들은 가격 반등에 힘입어 큰 폭의 이익 성장을 거뒀고(톈츠 소재 +900% 이상), 반면 해외 스타트업들은 여전히 큰 폭의 적자를 이어갔다(퀀텀스케이프 순손실 1억 9,900만 달러).