News

In recent years, the most common and straightforward framework for assessing demand across the lithium battery value chain has been to anchor it to EV sales. The logic was simple: the more vehicles sold, the stronger the battery demand; conversely, a slowdown in vehicle sales would imply weaker battery demand. This relationship held true in the early stages of the industry, when EV penetration was rapidly increasing, product structures were relatively simple, and battery demand exhibited a strong linear correlation with vehicle sales. However, this linear relationship is now clearly weakening. Increasing evidence suggests that battery demand is no longer solely determined by vehicle sales , but is increasingly driven by multiple factors, including average battery capacity per vehicle, product mix, commercial vehicle electrification, and export dynamics. 1. The “Vehicle Sales = Battery Demand” Formula Is Breaking Down At its core, vehicle sales represent the number of units sold, while battery demand reflects total energy consumption, i.e., total installed battery capacity. These two metrics only move in tandem when the average battery capacity per vehicle remains stable. Once average battery size increases, or when the sales mix shifts across BEV vs. PHEV, passenger vs. commercial vehicles, the direct linkage between vehicle sales and battery demand begins to decouple. As a result, assessing battery demand today requires answering several additional questions beyond headline vehicle sales: What is the average battery capacity per vehicle? Which vehicle segments are driving incremental growth? Are export flows and regional differences amplifying demand volatility? In other words, the industry is transitioning from a “unit-driven” model to an “energy-driven” model . 2. Rising Battery Capacity per Vehicle: The Primary Driver The most direct reason for the decoupling is the continuous increase in battery capacity per vehicle. This trend is driven by three key factors. First, vehicle upsizing. Both in China and overseas, EV consumption is shifting from basic electrification to enhanced user experience. The rising share of SUVs, pickup trucks, larger sedans, and premium vehicles naturally drives higher battery capacity per vehicle. Larger vehicle size, longer range requirements, and higher performance expectations all translate into higher kWh configurations. Second, the range competition is not over. While the industry has moved beyond the most aggressive phase of “range-at-all-costs,” consumers still place strong emphasis on real-world range, low-temperature performance, highway efficiency, and charging convenience. Even amid intense price competition, automakers are reluctant to reduce battery capacity, as it remains a core determinant of product competitiveness. Third, the growth of premium BEVs and heavy-duty applications. Although EV sales growth is expected to moderate going forward, battery demand is still projected to grow at a faster pace, with increasing battery capacity per vehicle being a key contributor. This reflects a critical shift: vehicles may not be selling faster, but each vehicle is consuming more battery capacity. Therefore, relying solely on slowing vehicle sales growth to infer weaker battery demand may significantly underestimate the offsetting effect from rising battery capacity per vehicle. 3. Product Mix Matters More Than Total Sales Volume Beyond battery capacity, changes in product mix are also reshaping battery demand. For instance, selling one million EVs with a higher BEV share will result in stronger battery demand than the same volume with a higher PHEV share, due to differences in battery size. In other words, shifts between different powertrain technologies directly impact overall battery intensity. Globally, this structural divergence is becoming more pronounced. In Europe, policy adjustments have led to a temporary rebound in PHEVs, which dilutes average battery capacity per vehicle. In contrast, China continues to maintain a high share of BEVs and higher-capacity vehicles, supporting stronger battery demand intensity. Thus, evaluating battery demand today requires understanding not just how many vehicles are sold, but what types of vehicles are driving the growth . 4. Commercial Vehicle Electrification: The Most Undervalued Growth Driver If rising battery capacity per vehicle represents the first layer of demand restructuring, then the electrification of commercial vehicles represents the second—and arguably the most underestimated—layer. Passenger EVs typically carry battery packs in the range of tens of kWh, whereas electric heavy-duty trucks, construction vehicles, and specialty vehicles often require 300–600 kWh or more. This means that a single electric truck can generate battery demand equivalent to multiple passenger EVs . Even with a smaller sales base, incremental penetration in commercial vehicles can significantly amplify overall battery demand. Rising oil prices further accelerate this trend by improving the total cost of ownership (TCO) of electric commercial vehicles, particularly in high-utilization, heavy-load, and fixed-route applications. In such scenarios, electrification becomes economically compelling much faster. As a result, while commercial vehicles are not the largest segment by volume, they are likely to become one of the most powerful “energy leverage” drivers of battery demand in the near term. 5. Exports, Inventory Cycles, and Production Scheduling Are Increasing the Mismatch In addition to end-market dynamics, midstream factors such as exports, inventory cycles, and production scheduling are further widening the gap between vehicle sales and battery demand. On one hand, changes in export policies, overseas customer stocking behavior, and shifts in trade flows can either front-load or delay battery and materials production. On the other hand, inventory cycles are once again becoming a central analytical framework. Automakers and distributors are no longer maintaining stable inventory levels; instead, they dynamically adjust stocking based on sales trends and pricing competition. This means that battery production is increasingly influenced by inventory drawdowns, restocking cycles, and order visibility—rather than simply mirroring real-time vehicle sales. Analyst SMM Lithium Battery Analyst Lesley Yang yangle@smm.cn

Since the beginning of this year, the spot treatment charge market for copper concentrates has shown an unprecedented and severe downward trend. The SMM Copper Concentrate Spot Index has fallen from -45 USD/dmt at the start of the year to near -70 USD/dmt, with the speed and magnitude of the decline being historically rare. A negative treatment charge means that when smelters purchase copper concentrates, they not only fail to receive traditional processing income from miners but instead must pay the sellers. Based on the current TC of -70 USD/dmt, the actual cost smelters pay sellers in the copper smelting process is equivalent to a TC of 70 USD, or further converted to a TC+RC of approximately 112 USD. This extreme price signal has quickly drawn high market attention to smelter profitability and even sparked concerns about the sustainability of domestic copper smelting production. Despite treatment charges falling to historic lows, copper cathode production by Chinese smelters remains at high levels, currently around 1.2 million tons per month. This phenomenon of "producing more while losing more" appears, on the surface, to contradict market logic, but actually reflects smelters' passive choices and structural supporting factors in the current complex environment. Historically, extreme treatment charge scenarios are not unprecedented. In past industry downturns, smelters often relied on one or several factors—exchange rate fluctuations, rising sulfuric acid prices, or treatment charges themselves—to barely maintain cash flow balance. In the current cycle, the sharp rise in sulfuric acid prices has become a key variable supporting smelter survival. Currently, the ex-factory prices of smelter acid sold by domestic copper smelters generally range from 800 to 1,600 yuan per ton. The latest SMM Copper Smelting Acid Index stands at 1,235.5 yuan/ton. As a crucial byproduct of copper smelting, sulfuric acid price fluctuations significantly impact smelters' comprehensive earnings. Typically, smelters produce approximately one ton of sulfuric acid for every dry metric ton of copper concentrate processed. Based on the current sulfuric acid price of 1,235.5 yuan/ton, after deducting value-added tax (at a 13% rate) and converting to US dollars (using an exchange rate of 6.9), each ton of sulfuric acid can contribute about 158 USD in revenue for the smelter, equivalent to an additional 158 USD per dry metric ton of copper concentrate. If further converted to the TC+RC metric, this amounts to about 99 USD. Thus, the rise in sulfuric acid prices has significantly offset the loss pressure from negative copper concentrate treatment charges, with some more efficient smelters even achieving marginal profitability. It is precisely this "stabilizer" role of sulfuric acid that allows smelters to maintain high operating rates under extreme treatment charge conditions. However, the support of sulfuric acid for smelting profits is not unlimited, as its price trend is itself influenced by more complex international geopolitical factors. The recent sharp escalation of the Middle East situation has brought significant uncertainty to the global sulfuric acid and sulfur supply chain. Since the joint US-Israeli military strike against Iran on February 28, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz, the world's most critical energy transport route, has rapidly fallen into a severe transit crisis. After taking office, Iran's new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, immediately declared that the strait would remain closed as a strategic lever against the US-Israeli alliance and suggested that neighboring countries close US military bases. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps subsequently explicitly announced a ban on any vessels associated with the US or Israel from passing through the Strait of Hormuz, warning of severe consequences for unauthorized passage. The Strait of Hormuz is a critical chokepoint for global sulfur transport. Statistics show that before the conflict, over 100 ships passed through the strait daily. However, after the conflict erupted, transit traffic plummeted by over 90%, with extreme cases of no ships passing for an entire day, leaving over 3,000 vessels stranded in nearby waters. This effective blockade has not only directly impacted the crude oil market—with Brent crude futures rising over 50% within a month to exceed 114 USD per barrel—but has also severely disrupted the global supply chain for sulfur and sulfuric acid. War risks have caused shipping insurance costs to soar to over 20% of the cargo value, further increasing logistics costs and plunging global sulfur supply into a logistical crisis. Although Iran claims to allow passage for vessels from "non-hostile" countries, requiring them to obtain prior permission, actual transit volumes remain extremely low, far below global trade demand. Simultaneously, the Houthi armed group in Yemen has announced its involvement, posing new security threats to the Red Sea-Suez route. The compounding pressure on the two major shipping chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea is posing a systemic challenge to the global supply chains for energy and chemical raw materials. As the primary raw material for sulfuric acid production, the disruption in sulfur supply directly drives international and domestic sulfuric acid prices progressively higher. Given the current situation, geopolitical conflicts show no signs of easing in the short term, implying further room for sulfuric acid price increases. The continued rise in sulfuric acid prices will have a dual impact on the domestic copper smelting industry. On the one hand, increased sulfuric acid revenue will continue to provide crucial profit supplementation for smelters, enabling them to maintain production even at lower TC levels and potentially further depressing spot copper concentrate treatment charges. On the other hand, this surge in sulfuric acid prices, driven by geopolitical conflict, also makes smelter profitability highly dependent on external unstable factors, rendering the industry's overall risk resilience increasingly fragile. Notably, the extreme treatment charge environment has begun to have a tangible impact on the global layout of copper smelting capacity. Mitsubishi Materials of Japan recently announced its plan to cease operations at its Onahama copper smelter by the end of March 2027. The smelter has a crude and refined capacity of 230,000 tons, and the main reason for the closure is precisely the intensified competition in the global copper smelting industry, leading to a sharp deterioration in copper concentrate TC/RC and persistent pressure on business prospects. This decision sends a clear signal: against the backdrop of continuously bottoming treatment charges and industry profits highly dependent on byproducts and external environments, some high-cost smelting capacity or those lacking comprehensive recovery capabilities are facing pressure to exit the market. In summary, China's copper smelting industry is currently at a highly unusual cyclical juncture. On one hand, smelters, benefiting from high sulfuric acid prices, have temporarily weathered the impact of negative treatment charges, maintaining high output. On the other hand, sulfuric acid prices themselves are heavily dependent on geopolitical situations, and external variables like the Strait of Hormuz blockade introduce significant uncertainty into the sustainability of smelting profits. If tensions in the Middle East persist, sulfuric acid prices may continue to rise, leaving room for TC to fall further, potentially enhancing smelters' tolerance for extreme treatment charges in phases. However, if geopolitical tensions ease, sulfur supply chains recover, and sulfuric acid prices retreat from their highs, smelters would face the risk of a "double blow" from both low treatment charges and reduced byproduct revenue, potentially heralding a genuine phase of capacity reduction and deep adjustment for the industry. Therefore, the current apparent "resilience" of the copper smelting industry is essentially built upon a fragile balance between geopolitical factors and the byproduct market. For market participants, besides monitoring TC trends, it is crucial to closely track changes in sulfuric acid prices and the underlying geopolitical factors to make more accurate judgments regarding the production sustainability and profitability prospects of the smelting industry.

Recent volatility in the Indonesian commodities sector has been driven by mixed signals regarding new fiscal policies. Market participants are currently evaluating the implications of two distinct regulatory mechanisms: a broader windfall tax on bulk commodities like coal, nickel, and a targeted export duty. The conflation of these two policies has generated significant market uncertainty, culminating in a sharp spike in global nickel prices this week. To understand the current market anxiety, which culminated in a sharp spike in global nickel prices this week, it is essential to unpack the timeline of these policy discussions, differentiate the fiscal mechanisms at play, and assess the likelihood of their implementation. Background: From Broad Windfall Deliberations to Targeted Export Tariffs The narrative surrounding new commodity taxes in Indonesia did not emerge overnight; rather, it has evolved through distinct phases of policy signaling. The current policy discourse has evolved in phases. Initial discussions, highlighted by statements from Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto on Mar 13, 2026, focused on the potential implementation of a windfall tax. This broader fiscal measure was aimed at capturing excess margins from exporters of coal, palm oil, and base metals, such as nickel, gold, and copper during periods of elevated global prices, functioning primarily as a macroeconomic revenue-generation tool. However, the conversation shifted dramatically on March 25, 2026. According to Bloomberg, news broke that Indonesia’s President had officially approved an export tax specifically targeting coal and nickel. This headline acted as an immediate catalyst, sending LME and SHFE nickel prices spiking. The confusion currently gripping the market stems from the conflation of these two distinct policy trajectories: the older, revenue-focused windfall tax concept championed by economic ministers, and the newly approved, strategically focused nickel export tax aimed at forcing further downstream industrialization. Analysis & Understanding: The Precedent of the "Windfall Tax" To accurately gauge the impact of these rumors, it is critical to understand that the concept of a "windfall tax" is not entirely unprecedented in Indonesia's regulatory framework, particularly for bulk commodities. There has actually been a windfall tax structure in place previously, though often masked under the nomenclature of progressive royalties and non-tax state revenues (PNBP). For the coal sector, the government already utilizes a tiered royalty system pegged to the Harga Batubara Acuan (HBA) benchmark. As coal prices escalate into higher brackets, the royalty percentage automatically increases, effectively acting as a windfall capture mechanism. Similarly before, the nickel sector utilizes the Domestic Benchmark Price (HPM) and associated royalty structures to adjust to global price rallies. It is crucial to note that the government has previously experimented with specific windfall profit provisions for downstream products, though the regulatory stance has recently hardened. For instance, under Government Regulation (GR) No. 26/2022, a unique windfall profit incentive was applied to nickel matte: when prices exceeded $21,000 per ton, the royalty rate was actually reduced from the standard 2% to 1%. (Old Version) However, this accommodating policy was explicitly abolished under the recent GR No. 19/2025. The removal of this incentive underscores a definitive shift toward more aggressive state revenue capture. Consequently, the recent "windfall tax" rumors primarily concern further tightening these existing brackets or introducing a supplementary surcharge on operating margins above a specific baseline. (New Version) Conversely, the newly approved nickel export tax serves a different primary function. Therefore, it is completely different than the concept of windfall tax. Rather than merely earning from peak profits, an export duty on semi-processed nickel (like NPI, MHP, FeNi, and Nickel Matte) is a structural tool designed to penalize the export of lower-value products. It is the natural continuation of Indonesia’s downstreaming (hilirisasi) agenda, intended to force producers to build stainless steel and EV battery precursor plants domestically in Indonesia, rather than shipping intermediate goods to other countries. While a windfall tax fluctuates with market prices, an export tax acts as a permanent structural cost added to the global supply chain. Conclusion: Imminent Implementation Amidst Ongoing Deliberations Despite definitive headlines regarding executive approval and the targeted April 1, 2026 implementation date, the exact implementation details are currently under review by the relevant ministries. Currently, specific details, including exactly how the proposed 5%, 8%, and 11% tiers might translate from coal to specific nickel material classifications (e.g., NPI, MHP, and high-grade matte), must be urgently finalized ahead of the April deadline. The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM), the Ministry of Finance, and the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime and Investment Affairs are working to balance state revenue optimization with the need to maintain the global cost-competitiveness of domestic smelters. This deliberative phase should not be interpreted as a policy reversal. According to SMM's understanding and industry checks, the implementation of these fiscal measures is highly probable. While the exact rollout of tariffs may be structured to mitigate immediate operational shocks to the domestic smelting sector, the fundamental policy direction indicates that the era of tariff-free exports for intermediate nickel products might decisively coming to an end.