
Published: Jul 14, 2026 - 3:56 AM (Kitco News) – Gold’s recent price decline reveals an important paradox: a stronger U.S. dollar can pressure gold prices in the short term while ultimately strengthening gold's long-term investment case, according to Paul Wong, managing partner and market strategist at Sprott Inc. In his latest in-depth monthly analysis of the gold market, Wong pointed out that spot gold lost $532.24 per ounce in June – nearly 12% – to finish the month at $4,008 for its fourth consecutive monthly loss. “June’s monthly decline was the largest since October 2008,” he noted. “For the quarter ended June 30, gold fell by $660.04, or -14.14%, the worst quarter since the second quarter of 2013, which is when the Federal Reserve (Fed) began its first rate-hiking cycle after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.” Wong said gold's latest and deepest monthly correction pushed market sentiment into extreme bearish territory. “The June selling wave in gold began with the signing of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. and Iran, which sent oil prices plummeting and the U.S. dollar rising,” he said. “The second selling wave was catalyzed by the market’s hawkish interpretation of new Fed Chair Kevin Warsh's remarks after the June meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). This was Warsh’s first FOMC meeting as Fed chair.” Wong said that rising rate hike expectations drove short-end yields higher, which served to further strengthen the U.S. dollar. “Most quant traders would have interpreted a U.S. dollar breakout combined with rising short-term rates as bearish for gold.” “Investment funds sold gold in the March to May period to unwind extremely leveraged positions,” he noted. “They continued selling during June as macro readings worsened and sovereign-related entities pulled back on gold buying. It was commodity trading advisors, quant and algo-type funds that predominantly drove the waterfall declines in June as they sold further or entered modest short positions.” “The drop in gold prices appears to be much more significant than the actual moves in the U.S. dollar and federal funds rates,” he added. “It suggests that much of the potential negative effects of a higher-rate, stronger-dollar combination have already been discounted.” Wong wrote that gold’s decline in the first half of 2026 matches previous periods of extreme bearish sentiment. “In June, gold fell below its 200-day moving average for the first time since October 2023 (see Figure 1) and has now reached extreme oversold levels,” he said. “Over the past decade, gold has tended to find support when prices fall to 90% of its 200-day moving average (Figure 1, lower panel). The drawdown has reached -26% (Figure 1, middle panel), the largest drawdown in a decade since the lows of 2016.” Meanwhile, the U.S. Dollar Index has increased by 2.91% year-to-date, while U.S. two-year Treasury yields have risen by 70 basis points year-to-date. “At the beginning of the year, fed funds futures were pricing in 2.3 rate cuts for the remainder of 2026,” Wong noted. “This has now shifted to 1.5 rate hikes due to the change in inflation expectations.” Wong said the emerging policy conflict at the Fed is one of the most significant narratives for markets. “One of the biggest questions facing markets today is whether Fed Chair Kevin Warsh is a hawk or a pragmatist,” he wrote. “Will he prioritize inflation control or accommodate the political and market pressures for lower interest rates? Warsh inherited an economy that remains surprisingly resilient. Labor markets are strong, growth is solid, asset prices are elevated, and inflation is still running well above the Fed’s 2% target. Simultaneously, President Trump has repeatedly called for lower rates. There is a tension between economic realities and political expectations.” Wong noted that the debate is now shifting from the expectation of rate cuts to potential rate hikes. “Warsh's inherited problem is that inflation never really died,” he said. “The economy has refused to slow, job openings remain elevated, payroll growth has surprised to the upside, consumer spending is healthy, and manufacturing and services activity continue to expand. Meanwhile, inflation remains sticky. Core PCE inflation8 is running around 3.3–3.4%, headline CPI inflation remains above 4%, and services inflation continues to prove difficult to tame.” “The AI buildout is also creating new inflationary pressures as memory shortages and rising component costs feed into consumer prices,” he added. “Investors are increasingly concerned that inflation may be more persistent than policymakers and markets expected.” But despite this persistent inflation, investors seem to doubt that Warsh will be genuinely hawkish on monetary policy. “Many continue to believe in the ‘Fed put,’ the idea that significant market weakness would eventually force policymakers to reverse course and lower rates,” Wong said. “Trump’s preferred outcome appears straightforward: lower rates, strong growth, rising equity markets and continued investment. The challenge is that the current economic backdrop does not clearly justify an easier policy. Warsh, therefore, finds himself caught between political demands for easier money and economic data that may argue for tighter policy. Maintaining Fed independence while navigating those pressures could prove challenging.” “The rising tension between inflation, politics and central bank credibility creates an environment that has historically supported gold,” Wong said. “Ultimately, the question is whether the Fed remains willing and able to prioritize price stability over political and market pressures. The answer to this question may prove far more important for gold than the precise path of interest rates over the next few quarters.” Wong also updated his analysis of another key market narrative: The cyclical strength of the U.S. dollar within a broader secular decline. “For years, we have maintained the view that the U.S. dollar is in long-term decline, not necessarily in exchange-rate terms, but in its purchasing power and role as the dominant store of monetary value,” he wrote. “Massive fiscal deficits, a rising debt burden, persistent monetary expansion, accelerating central bank gold purchases and increasing geopolitical fragmentation all point toward the gradual erosion of the U.S. dollar-centric system.” But the reality, Wong said, is more nuanced. “Despite repeated predictions of its demise, the dollar continues to stage powerful rallies periodically,” he said. “These rallies put pressure on commodities, precious metals, emerging markets and risk assets.” “Gold may be in a secular bull market, but it has also experienced sharp corrections alongside silver, copper, oil and other hard assets,” he warned. “A weakening monetary regime doesn't prevent powerful U.S. dollar rallies.” In order to understand this seeming contradiction, investors must separate two forces that are often lumped together. “The dollar remains structurally indispensable to global financial system settlements even as its long-term role as a monetary reserve slowly erodes,” Wong said. “In other words, the dollar may be experiencing secular decline, but it can still have powerful cyclical periods of strength for many years.” And every big U.S. dollar rally creates economic and financial stress for the rest of the world. “A stronger dollar increases debt-servicing costs for foreign borrowers, tightens global liquidity, raises funding costs and often forces traders to unwind leveraged positions and carry trades,” he said. “At the same time, dollar strength encourages central banks to diversify reserves. Countries increasingly seek to reduce dependency on a financial system that can be influenced and coerced by U.S. policy objectives. China has expanded the use of alternative settlement systems such as CIPS and mBridge, while many nations are exploring regional trade arrangements and various reserve diversification strategies.” Wong believes that gold is becoming the reserve asset of a new, multipolar world. “The paradox is that the stronger the U.S. dollar becomes, the greater the incentive for countries to find alternatives to it,” he said. “The most likely outcome is not the replacement of the dollar with a single reserve currency but the gradual emergence of a more diversified or multipolar system. The U.S. dollar may remain dominant in reserves and funding while other currencies gain influence in trade, regional currencies become more important, and gold acts as a neutral reserve asset between the various competing blocs. Hence, reserve managers seem focused on diversifying rather than replacing. They still need dollars; they just want fewer of them.” “Gold occupies a unique position in this evolving framework as it is ‘outside money,’” Wong wrote. “Unlike sovereign currencies, it carries no political allegiance. Unlike government bonds, it has no counterparty risk. Unlike bank deposits, it cannot be frozen or sanctioned if held domestically.” “As geopolitical tensions rise and reserve diversification accelerates, central banks increasingly view gold as a strategic reserve asset,” he said. “Its role is gradually evolving from an inflation hedge to a monetary hedge, a reserve asset and potentially a form of monetary collateral.” Wong noted that before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the IMF calculated that gold reserves averaged 12% of total world reserves since 2000, according to IMF data. “Since the freezing or seizure of Russia’s FX reserves and growing concerns of global currency and sovereign bond debasement, gold reserves as a percentage of total world reserves have soared to a recent high of ~34%, before closing the quarter at 27%,” he said. “The long-term secular trend of gold returning as a strategic reserve asset remains intact.” Wong also explored the counterintuitive reasons why gold seems to sell off during financial and liquidity crises. “Investors often expect turmoil to boost gold prices automatically, but history suggests otherwise,” he said. “During periods of acute funding stress, market participants need dollars. To obtain those dollars, they frequently sell their most liquid assets. Gold, as one of the world's most liquid and desired reserve assets, often serves as a source of liquidity. This occurred during the 2008 financial crisis and the March 2020 pandemic shock, and could occur again during future dollar squeezes. This does not represent a failure of gold. It is gold performing its reserve function.” Wong pointed out that even as gold continues its secular ascent as a reserve asset, the yellow metal’s shorter-term price movements remain beholden to the U.S. dollar. “Over the long run, gold and the dollar can rise for very different reasons: gold reflecting growing demand for a neutral reserve asset and store of value, and the dollar reflecting its central role in the global funding system,” he said. “However, on a cyclical basis, gold still tends to exhibit a negative correlation with the U.S. Dollar Index (DXY). As shown in Figure 3, gold's long-term trend remains firmly higher, but periods of dollar strength have frequently coincided with temporary corrections or consolidation phases in gold prices. This distinction between gold's secular monetary revaluation and its cyclical sensitivity to dollar liquidity conditions is critical for understanding short-term volatility within a longer-term bull market.” Wong cautioned that the U.S. dollar can remain strong even as long-term dollar dominance declines. “Likewise, gold could experience meaningful corrections while remaining in a secular bull market,” he said. “Periodic dollar rallies, tighter liquidity, commodity weakness and gold corrections drive the cyclical trend. The secular trend points toward reserve diversification, central bank gold purchases, alternative payment systems and a gradual decline in the dollar's share of global reserves.” And these two forces are not actually contradictory. “Each episode of dollar strength creates additional incentives for diversification, while each diversification effort reinforces gold's long-term monetary role,” Wong said. “Each episode may accelerate the transition toward a more diversified monetary system, one in which gold increasingly serves as the neutral reserve asset linking competing currency blocs.” Source: https://www.kitco.com/news/article/2026-07-13/gold-becoming-reserve-asset-new-multipolar-world-sprotts-paul-wong
Jul 15, 2026 10:03
This week (July 13-16), the copper scrap market operated under a triple framework of copper prices retreating after rapid rises, ongoing reverse-invoicing compliance constraints, and deepening high-temperature off-season. The most-traded SHFE copper contract surged to 105,020 yuan/mt mid-week, up nearly 2,000 yuan/mt from the start of the week. However, copper scrap prices were supported by compliance costs and suppliers holding prices firm, so the weekly price fluctuation was less than 1,000 yuan/mt. The price spread between primary metal and scrap widened from 2,445 yuan/mt at the start of the week to 3,923 yuan/mt, up more than 2,200 yuan/mt from the previous weekend. The widening spread was entirely driven by the unilateral rise in copper cathode. The resistance of copper scrap to decline was a key supply-side feature this week, which directly spurred hedging-related purchase demand from secondary copper rod enterprises. The supply side continued the structurally tight pattern seen since 2026. The first underlying constraint was reverse-invoicing compliance requirements: aftershocks from compliance inspections in Jiangxi and Hubei in south China persisted, and invoice quotas remained restricted in Shuyang, Jiangsu, leaving available compliant and deductible copper scrap persistently tight. The second was that after Document 770 eliminated irregular local tax rebates at the end of 2025, small and medium-sized copper scrap traders that previously relied on subsidies were continuously exiting the market, and overall available supply contracted markedly compared with the same period in previous years. Additionally, suppliers generally held a psychological defense of not selling cheap before copper prices break below 100,000 yuan/mt, and the selling pace throughout the week closely followed copper price fluctuations. At the start of the week when copper prices pulled back, strong hold-back sentiment prevailed, and tight supply left secondary copper rod enterprises struggling to find low-priced material. In mid-week when copper prices surged above 105,000 yuan/mt, suppliers’ willingness to sell at fixed prices increased, but because downstream scrap-using sectors had weak orders in the off-season and low acceptance of high prices, sales did not occur in large volumes. Most material was purchased by secondary copper rod enterprises using a hedging logic of buying raw material and shorting futures, not for actual production restocking. Many rod enterprises stopped pricing directly after purchasing enough to meet daily demand in the morning session and did not chase higher prices to buy. At the end of the week copper prices consolidated and pulled back, suppliers switched back to hold-back mode, and supply tightened again. Regional divergence persisted. In south China, due to compliance costs and slow capital turnover, bare bright copper purchase prices were 400-600 yuan/mt lower than in the north, maintaining the unusual structure of different prices for the same material. Traders maintained a low-inventory strategy of quick turnover, not daring to stockpile and bet on rising prices. The issue of payment collection cycles extending beyond two weeks remained unresolved, further limiting the release of supply elasticity. The demand side remained overall weak, with secondary copper rod enterprises reporting scarce new orders throughout the week. The price difference between copper cathode rod and secondary copper rod surged to 1,510 yuan/mt mid-week, touching the critical line of economic viability, but lacked sustainability and pulled back to 950 yuan/mt by the week's end. Meanwhile, secondary copper rods remained at a premium to copper futures due to rigid raw material costs. New orders at terminal wire and cable enterprises were weak, and they still held wait-and-see expectations that "copper prices have further downside room," with procurement mainly driven by rigid demand in pulses. Throughout the week, copper scrap transactions were largely driven by copper price fluctuations and hedging demand, while restocking volume for actual production was minimal. After copper prices pulled back at the week's end, rod enterprises' purchase willingness weakened further. The market displayed a weak equilibrium where "when copper prices rise, suppliers sell and rod enterprises collect for hedging; when copper prices fall, suppliers hold back and rod enterprises wait for lower prices." Currently, the market remains constrained by the dual restrictions of compliant invoices and off-season demand. Going forward, if the price difference between primary metal and scrap stabilizes above 1,500 yuan/mt and the implementation rules for reverse invoicing become clearer, this may trigger the release of some rigid demand; otherwise, the weak transaction pattern will persist.
Jul 19, 2026 13:56