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Trump's Executive Order Tightens Defense Rare Earth Rules, but US Magnet Supply Gap Won't Close by 2027 On July 20, President Donald Trump signed an executive order requiring the Department of Defense to phase out most waivers by January 1, 2027, that have allowed defense contractors to procure samarium cobalt (SmCo) and neodymium iron boron (NdFeB) magnets, tantalum metal and alloys, tungsten metal powder and heavy alloys, and molybdenum from "non-allied foreign countries"—namely China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. From 2027 onward, contractors or subcontractors seeking a waiver must submit a DoD-approved mitigation plan, prove the precise origin of non-compliant materials, demonstrate extensive efforts to source compliant alternatives, and lay out a timeline for removing prohibited materials from their supply chains. In parallel, the order directs the DoD to issue policy guidance within 180 days, pushing contractors to map critical supply chains "from raw materials to end-use products" and to begin qualifying domestic sources of critical minerals, materials, and components. The Real Weight of the Order: Closing Loopholes, Not Breaking New Ground To assess the order's true significance, it must be read against Section 4872 of Title 10 of the US Code, enacted in 2018, which already prohibited the DoD from procuring the above sensitive materials from "adversary countries," with SmCo and NdFeB magnets being the core rare earth items at stake. The problem was that, for years, America's domestic rare earth permanent magnet industry remained too thin to meet defense demand, so the DoD kept issuing case-by-case waivers to keep Chinese imports flowing legally. The actual teeth of Trump's order lie not in the procurement ban itself—the law already mandated that—but in shifting waivers from "default issuance" to "item-by-item strict review," with "inability to build domestic supply" explicitly ruled out as a valid excuse. White House trade advisor Peter Navarro put it bluntly: contractors can no longer claim they had no choice without having tried anything. Symbolically, this marks the Trump administration's push to move "de-China-ification of the defense supply chain" from slogan to enforceable institution. Why the US Is Now "Following China's Playbook" The most telling provision is the 180-day mandate to build a full-chain traceability system—a clear benchmark against China. Since the Rare Earth Regulations took effect on October 1, 2024, China has required mining and smelting-separation enterprises to maintain flow-recording systems. In February 2025, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) circulated the Interim Measures for Rare Earth Product Information Traceability Management for public comment, establishing a rare earth traceability system jointly operated by MIIT, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ministry of Commerce, the General Administration of Customs, and the State Taxation Administration, covering the entire chain from production to circulation to use. Enterprises must upload product flow data to the government traceability platform monthly by the 10th of each month. Layered on top of this are the export controls on medium-and-heavy rare earth items implemented since April 2025, the "de minimis traceability" rule requiring licenses for re-exported products containing Chinese rare earth content above certain thresholds, and the whistleblower reward mechanisms rolled out in July 2026. Together, these form a closed-loop regulatory system of "quota—traceability—export review—anti-smuggling. The US requirement to map supply chains "from raw materials to final military products" is, at its core, an acknowledgment that any procurement ban is paper-thin without visibility into downstream flows. China has wielded its traceability system to make its rare earth leverage precise; the US is now forced to learn the same lesson. The Reality for US Defense: The Magnet Gap Cannot Be Closed by 2027 The market consensus that this ban carries far greater symbolic than practical weight holds up—and the root cause is the awkward state of US domestic rare earth magnet capacity. USA Rare Earth's commercial sintering NdFeB production line at Stillwater, Oklahoma, only began commissioning in March 2026. The company expects to reach a run-rate of 600 metric tons per annum (mtpa) by the end of Q4 2026, scaling to a combined 1,200 mtpa across two lines in Q1 2027. Even adding the planned 6,400 mtpa greenfield base at the Bailey Industrial Park in South Carolina, plus supporting projects such as MP Materials' NdPr conversion in Texas and Lynas' heavy rare earth separation plant in Texas, the overall progress remains in the "0-to-1" ramp-up stage. For context, mature magnet makers in Japan—Proterial, Shin-Etsu—each operate single-site capacities in the 2,000–3,000 mtpa range with deep technical moats, while China dominates global rare earth magnet supply and refining capacity. Annual US defense and high-end manufacturing demand for NdFeB magnets far exceeds the sum of all domestically planned capacity, meaning that when the waiver gate closes in 2027, domestic supply will clearly be insufficient to backfill. The heavy rare earth segment is even more precarious. MP Materials' NdPr oxide has yet to be effectively converted into metal and magnets in the short term. Lynas' heavy rare earth separation plant in Texas remains sluggish. Energy Fuels has spent heavily to acquire European magnet veteran VAC to expand heavy-rare-earth-containing magnet capacity, but short-term supply of dysprosium- and terbium-containing high-performance magnets remains inadequate, with feedstock still heavily dependent on Chinese or allied transshipment. Expected Impact on China's Rare Earth Exports For China, this executive order adds further uncertainty to the year-end 2026 extension of export controls and the issuance of general licenses. Considering the market adjustments following the April 2025 tightened controls and the gradual refinement of relevant legal and policy frameworks, the probability of a repeat of the aggressive April 2025 restrictions is relatively low. However, total NdFeB export volumes in 2026 are likely to take a hit. In the medium-to-long term, US "de-China-ification" will advance along two tracks: one is the "mine-to-magnet" vertical integration model exemplified by USA Rare Earth, targeting 10,000 mtpa of NdFeB capacity; the other is capacity expansion at high-end magnet bases in Japan and Europe (VAC, Neo, etc.). Both tracks point to the same reality—the US is spending 5–10 years plugging the magnet gap, but with rigid defense supply chain demand in place, the curve of declining dependence on China during the transition period will be far flatter than the political rhetoric suggests. One easily overlooked detail: the executive order explicitly excludes the US Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve (the so-called "Project Vault") and critical minerals produced by projects financially supported by EXIM or DFC from its scope. This effectively leaves a "back door" for the US—strategic stockpiling and federally funded projects can still be handled flexibly. This also confirms from the side that the order's true intent leans more toward "establishing rules and tightening accountability" than "cutting off supply tomorrow." Final Assessment Placed in the broader context of the US-China rare earth contest, this executive order is neither the decisive "decoupling" strike nor a merely symbolic political gesture. It is an act of institutional alignment —the US has realized that to hold equivalent leverage in the rare earth game, it must first build supply chain visibility on par with China's. But institutions can be signed overnight; capacity has to be ramped up ton by ton.

Argentina’s Puna Plateau in Catamarca Province has recently been hit by a historic snowstorm, accompanied by strong winds and extremely low temperatures. Temperatures in the Tres Quebradas area reportedly fell to around -27°C, while snowfall exceeded one metre in some locations, temporarily stranding a number of project workers at mine sites. Around Salar del Hombre Muerto, snow accumulation on certain roads reached 1–2 metres. Provincial Route 43, which connects Antofagasta de la Sierra with the surrounding salar projects, as well as several high-altitude roads, became largely impassable. Personnel transfers at Rio Tinto’s Fénix project were also affected. As of the evening of 23 July, the San Francisco international border crossing between Catamarca and Chile remained closed due to snow-covered roads. From a project-distribution perspective, the current weather disruption is primarily concentrated in Catamarca Province rather than across the entire South American salar region. Public information has confirmed disruptions to personnel movements and mine-site access at the 3Q and Fénix projects. Fénix has existing lithium product capacity of approximately 32,000 tonnes per year, while Phase 1 of the 3Q project has lithium carbonate capacity of 20,000 tonnes per year. The broader region also hosts the 15,000-tonne-per-year Sal de Vida project, as well as Sal de Oro, Hombre Muerto West and several other operating, ramping-up or under-construction projects. No major operator has yet formally announced a complete production shutdown or lowered its production guidance. Road closures therefore should not be treated as equivalent to a total loss of salar production. SMM believes the immediate impact will first be reflected in personnel rotations, deliveries of production inputs, equipment maintenance and outbound transportation of finished products. Fénix uses an adsorption-based direct lithium extraction process, meaning that extreme weather is more likely to affect the operation through logistics constraints and disruptions to continuous on-site operations. The 3Q project and other operations using evaporation ponds face not only transportation risks, but also potential delayed impacts on evaporation efficiency and brine concentration due to prolonged snowfall, low temperatures and subsequent snowmelt. Should road access recover within a short period, the main impact may be a delay in shipment schedules rather than a permanent loss of annual production. However, if restrictions on major roads and mine-site operations persist for more than two weeks, the disruption could begin to affect third-quarter production and the ramp-up schedules of newer projects. In terms of imports, China imported 25,861 tonnes of lithium carbonate in June 2026, of which 8,403 tonnes came from Argentina, accounting for approximately 32% of the total. Imports from Argentina reached 11,422 tonnes in May, marking a recent high. Argentina has become China’s second-largest source of imported lithium carbonate, with monthly volumes generally ranging between 8,000 and 11,000 tonnes. As a result, shipment disruptions at individual Argentine salar projects now have a more meaningful impact on China’s import structure than in previous years. SMM Scenario Analysis Based on current nameplate capacities, if only the Fénix and 3Q projects were to experience an actual 10-day production stoppage, the theoretical production impact would amount to approximately 1,000–1,500 tonnes of LCE. If the ramp-up at Sal de Vida and logistics disruptions at other projects around Salar del Hombre Muerto are also taken into account, the theoretical volume of production or shipments at risk could increase to 1,500–2,500 tonnes of LCE. However, no operator has yet confirmed a complete shutdown, and some projects may be able to maintain short-term shipments using on-site inventories. These figures should therefore be viewed as the volume exposed to potential disruption rather than confirmed supply losses. Under the base-case scenario, assuming the weather disruption lasts mainly for one to two weeks, the impact on Chinese imports is more likely to take the form of approximately 800–1,500 tonnes of lithium carbonate being delayed between August and September. This would be equivalent to around 10%–18% of China’s June lithium carbonate imports from Argentina and approximately 3%–6% of China’s total monthly lithium carbonate imports. Under a more severe scenario, if production or outbound transportation at Fénix, 3Q and nearby projects remains constrained for two to three weeks, the volume of imports into China delayed within a single month could reach 2,000–3,000 tonnes. This would be equivalent to approximately 24%–36% of Argentina’s current monthly shipments to China and around 8%–12% of China’s total monthly lithium carbonate imports. These estimates are scenario-based calculations derived from project capacities, recent import structures and different disruption durations. The actual impact will depend on the speed of road reopening, inventory levels at individual projects and the destination allocation of each producer’s shipments. Overall, the current snowstorm does not yet represent a systemic disruption to South American salar supply. Nevertheless, it has already caused tangible disruption to personnel movements, logistics and on-site operations at several key lithium projects in Catamarca Province. In the near term, the market should closely monitor the reopening of Provincial Route 43 and the San Francisco border crossing, the actual operating status of the Fénix and 3Q projects, and Argentina’s shipment data from late July through August. If transportation access is restored within the coming week, the principal impact is likely to be delayed arrival of imports into China. If mine-site restrictions persist, Argentina’s effective third-quarter supply and China’s lithium carbonate import expectations for August and September may need to be revised downwards. Sources: Salar del Hombre Muerto: Miners Rescued After Being Trapped in Snow for Three Days, SMM Lesley Yang, SMM yangle@smm.cn Jessica Wang, SMM wangjie@smm.cn