On 22 July 2026, Zimbabwe’s state-owned Mutapa Energy Resources released the JORC-compliant resource estimate for the Sandawana lithium project: Block A totals 39.9 million tonnes at 1.39% Li₂O, with an exceptional 72% classified as Measured. Block A accounts for only 30% of the lease area; the remaining 70% remains unexplored, and the company targets upgrading the total resource to 90 million tonnes. The Zimbabwean government has banned concentrate exports effective 1 January 2027 with no extension granted, forcing miners to accelerate local processing. Sandawana’s processing plan is still at the feasibility stage, lagging behind peers such as Huayou Cobalt (already in production), Sinomine and Yahua (under construction). Chinese capital is deeply involved: Huayou and Tsingshan are building a US$270 million concentrator under a BOT model, while Mutapa has secured an additional US$300 million in funding (including Chinese investors). SMM believes the high Measured proportion gives the project strong “bankability”, but the mismatch between resources and processing capacity, combined with the export ban countdown, makes the next six months decisive for the project’s success.
I. JORC Resource: Nearly 40 Mt with 72% Measured
On 22 July 2026, Zimbabwe’s state-owned lithium enterprise, Mutapa Energy Resources (MER), officially released the JORC (Joint Ore Reserves Committee)-compliant resource estimate for the Sandawana lithium mine. The report shows that Block A contains a total mineral resource of 39.9 million tonnes at an average grade of 1.39% Li₂O – of which Measured Resource is approximately 28.6 million tonnes, accounting for 72%; Indicated Resource is 2.7 million tonnes (6.8%); and Inferred Resource is 8.5 million tonnes (21.3%).
This proportion of Measured Resource is extremely rare in Zimbabwe’s mining industry. At the Harare press conference, Mutapa Energy CEO Innocent Rukweza stated: “To our knowledge, we are the first mine in Zimbabwe with a Measured Resource representing 72% of the total resource. Most mines are far below this level, while we have exceeded 50%, which makes the resource ‘bankable’.”
Even more noteworthy is that this 39.9 million tonnes resource is derived only from Block A, which covers just 30% of the entire 3,800-hectare mining lease. Blocks B and C – together accounting for 70% of the lease area – remain largely unexplored. Rukweza made it clear that the company aims to increase the total resource from the current nearly 40 million tonnes to 90 million tonnes.
To achieve the above exploration results, Mutapa Energy completed 103,000 metres of drilling and collected and tested 33,000 samples over the past 11 months, at a total cost of US$24 million. The company has already mined approximately 2 million tonnes of ore from Sandawana and is constructing a concentrator with an annual processing capacity of 3 million tonnes.
II. From Abandoned Emerald Mine to National Lithium Strategic Pillar
Sandawana is not a greenfield project. Its mining history dates back to 1955, when it was renowned for high-quality emerald (green beryl) production and operated for about 40 years. In 2010, operations were suspended due to working capital shortages and depletion of emerald resources.
The mine’s “second life” began with Zimbabwe’s national strategic shift. As the global energy transition accelerated, lithium rose from a niche mineral to “white petroleum”. The Zimbabwean government incorporated lithium development into its national strategy, and Sandawana was repositioned as a lithium and tantalum project, placed under Mutapa Energy Resources, which is owned by the Mutapa Investment Fund.
In 2025, the former operating entity Kuvimba Mining House announced a US$270 million investment to build a lithium concentrator at Sandawana, with construction planned to start in the third quarter of 2025 and commissioning targeted for early 2027. In February 2026, the Mutapa Investment Fund restructured Kuvimba into several specialised entities, and Mutapa Energy Minerals formally took over Sandawana, with Innocent Rukweza appointed as CEO. This restructuring marked Sandawana’s upgrade from a “legacy asset” to a flagship project of Zimbabwe’s national lithium strategy.
III. Lithium Sulphate Strategy: A Chaser under Policy Pressure
Sandawana’s processing roadmap is clear and urgent: concentrate → lithium sulphate → lithium carbonate.
Zimbabwe’s government has progressively tightened lithium controls: in 2022 it banned unprocessed raw ore exports; in June 2025 it announced a ban on lithium concentrate exports effective 1 January 2027; in February 2026 it temporarily suspended all concentrate exports, later granting conditional soft relief via quotas while imposing an additional 10%–16% tax on concentrate exports and requiring written commitments from companies to build lithium sulphate plants before 2027. The government has explicitly ruled out any extension and will enforce the ban as scheduled.
This policy imposes enormous time pressure on all lithium miners in Zimbabwe.
In June 2026, Rukweza, in his capacity as chairman of the Zimbabwe Lithium Producers’ Association, submitted an appeal to the government on behalf of the industry, requesting a postponement of the ban to March or June 2027. In his remarks, he stated candidly: “We are not trying to avoid our beneficiation obligations; we are sincerely asking for time to complete the projects we have already started.” He revealed that among the seven major lithium producers, only Huayou Cobalt’s lithium sulphate plant has been completed, commissioned and has achieved product shipments; Sinomine’s Bikita Minerals and Yahua’s Kamativi lithium mine are still under construction.
Sandawana’s processing scheme, by contrast, remains at the feasibility study stage. In other words, Sandawana is far ahead on resources but a chaser on processing. The company has committed approximately US$1.45 billion to local processing facilities, but the time window is narrowing.
IV. Chinese Capital: Deep Integration from Financing to Construction
Long before the investment landed, Chinese companies were already deeply embedded in Sandawana’s development chain. In September 2024, Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt and Tsingshan Holding Group reached a cooperation agreement with Zimbabwe’s state-owned Kuvimba Mining House (the predecessor of Mutapa Energy Resources). Under the agreement, the Chinese partners do not hold direct equity in Sandawana, but participate under a BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) model – the partners will operate the processing plant for at least 5 years after commissioning, during which they will recover construction costs and earn operating profits, after which all assets and titles will be transferred to the Zimbabwean state free of charge. In February 2026, Mutapa Energy Resources CEO Rukweza officially confirmed that the Sandawana concentrator would be built in cooperation with Huayou Cobalt and Tsingshan under this BOT framework. The facility involves an investment of US$270 million, with an annual processing capacity of 600,000 tonnes of ore, targeting commissioning in early 2027.
Dinson Holdings, as Tsingshan’s core investment platform in Zimbabwe, though not directly involved in the Sandawana project cooperation, operates an ore processing facility with an annual capacity of 1 million tonnes through its subsidiary Gwanda Lithium. Before Sandawana’s own concentrator is completed, some ore from Sandawana has been shipped to Gwanda for processing. Dinson has accumulated total investments of approximately US$900 million in Zimbabwe, covering ferrochrome smelting, coke, steel and lithium processing, forming a critical pillar for Tsingshan’s lithium operations in the country.
In addition, Sinomine Resource Group, Chengxin Lithium Group and Sichuan Yahua Industrial Group are among the Chinese companies that have invested in Zimbabwe’s lithium sector. Chinese capital’s presence in Zimbabwe’s lithium industry has extended from pure investment to full-chain cooperation covering technology, engineering, construction and off-take agreements.
SMM Perspectives
The release of Sandawana’s JORC resource has landmark significance on three levels:
First, the “certainty” value of resource quality. A Measured Resource proportion of 72% is exceptionally rare in African mining projects. This means geological risk has been substantially compressed, giving the project clear “bankability”. Against the backdrop of global lithium prices falling from their 2022 peak of approximately US$86,000/tonne to the current level of about US$14,000/tonne, capital is placing a higher premium on “certainty” – Sandawana’s high Measured proportion precisely meets that demand.
Second, the urgency of the time window. The 1 January 2027 concentrate export ban is now on a countdown. Sandawana’s resource is “in place”, but its processing capacity remains at the “feasibility study” stage. Huayou Cobalt is already in production, while Sinomine and Yahua are under construction – Sandawana clearly lags behind its peers on the processing front. Whether the US$300 million funding can translate into rapid processing facility construction will determine whether this “Zimbabwe’s largest undeveloped lithium asset” can complete its value realisation before the ban takes effect.
Third, the game of Zimbabwe’s “resource nationalism”. From the 2022 raw ore ban to the 2027 concentrate ban, Zimbabwe is advancing along a clear path: “ban raw ore → restrict concentrate → mandate lithium sulphate”. The objective is clear: to keep higher value-added links of the lithium value chain within the country. But for Sandawana, this means a stark choice between “selling concentrate” and “building a lithium sulphate plant” – and time is not on its side.
Sandawana possesses Zimbabwe’s highest-quality lithium resource endowment and carries the nation’s ambition to transform from a resource exporter into a battery materials producer. But whether the “quality” of its resources can translate into the “quantity” of processing capacity depends on a three-way race among capital, technology and policy. The US$300 million has arrived, the US$270 million concentrator is under construction, but the feasibility study for the lithium sulphate plant has only just begun. When the clock strikes January 2027, will Sandawana be an “exemption” or a “restricted party” under the concentrate export ban? The answer will be revealed in the next six months.
Sources: Mutapa Energy Resources, SMM, publicly available information
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