1. Fujimori’s Victory and Policy Background
Peru’s National Jury of Elections (JNE) has officially declared Keiko Fujimori, candidate of Fuerza Popular, as president-elect for the 2026–2031 term. She is scheduled to take office on July 28. According to international media reports, Fujimori defeated left-wing candidate Roberto Sánchez in the second-round runoff by 50.135% to 49.865%, a margin of around 50,000 votes. Fujimori is the eldest daughter of former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori and the leader of the right-wing Fuerza Popular party. She previously ran for president in 2011, 2016 and 2021, reaching the runoff each time but losing all three contests. Her 2026 campaign marked her fourth presidential bid and her first victory. Her father’s legacy remains highly divisive in Peru. Supporters credit his administration with defeating insurgent groups and stabilising the economy, while critics point to human rights abuses and corruption cases during his presidency. This background has made Keiko Fujimori one of Peru’s most influential and controversial political figures. For the copper industry, the key question is not whether the political transition will change near-term mine output. The more relevant issue is whether the proposed policy agenda can address Peru’s long-standing project execution bottlenecks. Peru is not short of copper resources or project pipeline. Supply growth has been constrained by permitting timelines, infrastructure gaps, community relations, illegal mining governance and local implementation capacity.
According to Fuerza Popular’s Plan de Gobierno 2026–2031: Perú con Orden, the mining agenda includes modernising the General Mining Law, establishing a fast-track mechanism for strategic projects, introducing tax incentives for mining reinvestment, improving mining-related infrastructure through PPPs and the Obras por Impuestos mechanism, promoting smelting and mineral processing, creating a digital single window for mining permits, strengthening illegal mining enforcement, advancing the formalisation of small-scale and artisanal mining (MAPE), remediating environmental legacy issues, and allocating up to 40% of Canon Minero revenues directly to residents in mining districts.
These measures remain part of the government plan. Their implementation will depend on legislation, administrative execution and local governance.
2. Key Differences between the Existing Framework and the Proposed Policy Agenda
Fujimori’s mining agenda does not represent a break from Peru’s existing reliance on mining investment as a driver of economic growth. The shift is more specific: from maintaining a large project pipeline to improving project delivery. Peru’s existing policy framework has already focused on attracting mining investment, maintaining tax stability, updating the mining investment portfolio and promoting large-scale project development. The proposed agenda places greater emphasis on faster permitting, mining infrastructure, reinvestment incentives, illegal mining enforcement and mining revenue redistribution.
In other words, the agenda is not about redesigning Peru’s mining regime. It is aimed at addressing execution gaps within the current system.
3. Near-term Output Has Recovered, but Project Delivery Remains Key
Peru’s copper mine output has remained at a high level in recent years, but growth elasticity remains limited. Copper-in-concentrate output stood at around 2.733 million tonnes in 2024 and increased to around 2.769 million tonnes in 2025, a year-on-year increase of only 1.3%. Monthly data point to a gradual recovery in the first four months of 2024–2026. Peru produced around 845,000 tonnes of copper-in-concentrate in the first four months of 2024, rising to 887,000 tonnes in the same period of 2025 and further to 918,000 tonnes in the first four months of 2026. This represents growth of around 3.5% year-on-year and around 8.6% compared with the same period in 2024. However, stronger output in the first four months does not mean that the project pipeline has been converted into stable new supply. Mine scheduling, ore grades, maintenance cycles, transport conditions and project ramp-up progress can all affect monthly production.
At the project level, the proposed policy agenda is relevant to Tía María, Zafranal, Michiquillay, Los Chancas, La Granja and the Antamina expansion. The transmission channels differ by project. For Tía María, the main constraints remain community relations and project execution. A more supportive policy environment could improve the project’s development conditions. However, its construction timeline will still depend on local acceptance, site execution and regulatory implementation. Zafranal, Michiquillay, Los Chancas and La Granja are more exposed to permitting, financing, engineering progress and infrastructure readiness. If the fast-track mechanism, digital mining single window and infrastructure plans are implemented effectively, they could improve the conditions for advancing these projects. Antamina’s expansion is closer to a brownfield extension and expansion case. Compared with greenfield projects, brownfield developments may respond more quickly to reinvestment incentives, permitting improvements and infrastructure upgrades. Overall, the proposed agenda is unlikely to translate directly into immediate copper output. Its main effect would be to improve the conditions for moving projects from planned capacity to actual production. If implemented effectively, the first impact would likely be on project expectations and investment decisions, before gradually feeding through into construction progress and supply delivery. The timing of output realisation will still depend on each project’s development stage and project-specific constraints.
4. Core Constraints on Copper Supply Remain
Despite proposed measures to improve permitting efficiency, infrastructure and the investment environment, Peru’s copper supply growth still faces several structural constraints. Community relations remain a key variable for large-scale project development. Road blockades, benefit-sharing disputes, water concerns and employment demands may continue to affect mine construction, operations and concentrate transport. Policy implementation also requires legislation, administrative execution and local coordination. Even if the central government sets a clear direction, reforms to mining legislation, the fast-track mechanism and Canon redistribution will still require detailed rules and cooperation at the local level. Environmental permitting, water management and infrastructure remain practical bottlenecks for large copper projects. Permitting procedures can be streamlined, but projects must still meet environmental, water, land-use and social licence requirements. Natural mine depletion will also continue to weigh on output growth. Some of Peru’s major copper mines are entering more mature operating stages. Declining ore grades, rising stripping requirements and marginal output decline at older operations will make it harder for existing mines to maintain or increase production. Even if the policy environment improves, Peru will still need new project start-ups and brownfield expansions to offset depletion at existing assets.
Based on SMM’s production forecast, Peru’s total copper-in-concentrate output is expected to reach a near-term peak in 2026 before gradually declining. Although Tía María, Zafranal, Michiquillay and Los Chancas represent potential future additions, project pipeline does not equal actual supply. New projects must first offset grade decline and depletion at existing mines before generating net supply growth. Corporate capital allocation is another constraint. Copper prices, financing costs, project IRRs and parent-company investment priorities will all influence whether projects move into actual development. As a result, a more supportive policy direction does not imply a rapid increase in copper supply. Peru’s future supply growth will depend on the balance between new project delivery, brownfield expansions and depletion at mature mines. Growth is more likely to be gradual than concentrated in the short term.
5. Conclusion
Based on the government plan released so far, Fujimori’s mining agenda does not focus on raising mining taxes or advancing resource nationalism. Instead, it centres on project execution, infrastructure development, reinvestment incentives, illegal mining enforcement and mining revenue distribution. Compared with the existing framework, the key change is not a shift in Peru’s mining development direction, but a stronger focus on execution tools. Peru does not lack copper resources or project pipeline. The key question is whether projects can move more quickly from the investment portfolio into construction and production. For the copper market, the political transition is more likely to affect medium- to long-term project risk premiums and investment expectations than Peru’s actual copper concentrate supply in 2026. Key areas to monitor include the appointment of the mining minister, mining law reform, implementation of the fast-track mechanism, detailed rules for Canon para el Pueblo, and permitting and construction progress at Tía María, Zafranal, Michiquillay, La Granja and Los Chancas. Overall, if the proposed measures are implemented effectively, Peru’s medium- to long-term copper project development conditions could improve. However, unless key constraints around communities, permitting and infrastructure are materially addressed, Peru’s copper supply is unlikely to increase significantly in the short term.
