[SMM data] June 2020 Nickel Wet smelting Intermediate products Import-Sub-Trade

Malaysia Have Over 80 Small and Medium-Sized Low-Grade Iron Ore Mines, led by three large-scale enterprises: the blending and distribution center established by Brazil's Vale in Malaysia, along with two local mining companies, Fortress Minerals and Southern Alliance Mining (SAM).

Malaysia exported just 7,181 tonnes of stainless-steel scrap in 2024, with India (72%) and Taiwan (24%) taking nearly all. China bought only 111 tonnes (1.5%), showing how its strict GB/T 39733-2020 import rules keep Malaysian scrap out despite higher prices. Without investment in sorting and certification, Malaysia will stay dependent on India and Taiwan.

【SMM Scrap Aluminium Market Analysis: Interpretating Data of Chinese Imports of Scrap Aluminium 2024-25】According to data from Shanghai Metals Market (SMM), China imported a total of 1.17 million tonnes of scrap aluminium from January to July 2025, representing a 7.34% increase compared to 1.09 million tonnes during the same period in 2024. Five key source regions: Thailand, Malaysia, the European Union, Japan and South Korea, collectively exported 696,900 tonnes to China during the same period, an 11% year-on-year increase. Their combined share of China’s total scrap aluminium imports rose from 57.61% to 59.56%, indicating a further increase in China’s reliance on these regions for scrap aluminium, especially Thailand.

US Tariff Turmoil and the Performance of Copper Pipe & Tube Imports and Exports

In July 2025, China's phosphate ore imports fell from 179,000 mt in June to 120,000 mt, down 33.1% MoM; the import value decreased from $17.686 million to $11.6 million, down 34.4% MoM. Jordan replaced Egypt as the top supplier. Exports increased from 5,000 mt to 11,000 mt, up 118.7% MoM, with Fujian becoming the sole exporting province.

The significant increase in grain-oriented electrical steel exports in 2024 is the result of domestic capacity release, a surge in international demand, product structure upgrades, and policy coordination. In 2025, Baosteel's ultra-high-grade electrical steel project and Angang's HiB grain-oriented electrical steel are expected to be put into production, making domestic supply even more abundant. Coupled with the acceleration of global new energy infrastructure, it is projected that the total export volume will exceed 700,000 mt in 2025, and China's share in the global trade of grain-oriented electrical steel is likely to further increase.

All in all, the policy pivot on July 30 is not an isolated event, but rather a strategic move under the broader umbrella of the Trump administration’s “manufacturing reshoring” agenda. The resulting spread volatility, collapse of arbitrage flows, and rerouting of global shipments represent a structural correction to both market expectations and resource allocation mechanisms. More importantly, this event lays the groundwork for long-term shifts in copper industry dynamics, regional competition, and global policy risks.

Recently, the United States has introduced “transshipment clauses” in new trade agreements with countries like Vietnam and Indonesia. While these provisions appear to target the circumvention of tariffs through third-country routing, their design clearly reflects a strategic intent to target China. In essence, they represent a key component of the U.S. effort to promote the “de-Sinicization” of global supply chains.