"Sodium-ion Battery" Included in the "Strengthened" List During the 15th Five-Year Plan: One Policy, Three Accounts [SMM Analysis]

SMM, September 18:

On September 15, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) jointly issued the "15th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Electronic Information Manufacturing Industry."

Most market attention was drawn to two headline figures—revenue of large-scale enterprises exceeding 30 trillion yuan by 2030 and R&D intensity of 3.5%. But in SMM's view, what carries real information for the sodium-ion battery industry chain is the passage of fewer than 100 words in the "new-type battery" column:

  ...R&D and industrialisation of low-cost, long-life sodium-ion batteries.

Six words, with the emphasis on "low-cost." This is not a modifier; it is a positioning.

I. Why "low-cost, long-life" rather than "high specific energy" or "high safety"

The adjectives the plan attaches to the three technology routes—lithium batteries, solid-state batteries, and sodium-ion batteries—are telling: lithium batteries get "high safety," solid-state gets "high specific energy," and only sodium-ion batteries receive the less glamorous-sounding "low-cost, long-life." SMM believes this is precisely the plan's most honest pricing of sodium-ion batteries:

the energy density ceiling of sodium-ion batteries is lower than that of LFP, and current technology has no claim to the "high specific energy" narrative;

the thermal stability of sodium-ion batteries is inherently far superior to that of liquid lithium batteries, but this is not its scarcest selling point at present;

the only card it can bring to market competition is cost per kWh benchmarked against LFP—and this is exactly the fundamental reason the plan uses the word "low-cost."

In other words, the plan has already written sodium-ion batteries' competitor into its adjectives. Its competitor has never been solid-state; it is LFP.

II. The consumption tax exemption is an "economic insurance policy," but the policy has an expiry date

Whether sodium-ion batteries can survive independently of subsidies before the policy window closes at the end of 2028 is the most pressing question for the industry chain right now. This question can be broken down into two accounts.

The first account: tax. According to the battery consumption tax framework previously announced by three ministries, lithium-ion batteries have been subject to a 2% tax rate since September 1, 2026, rising to 4% from September 1, 2027; sodium-ion batteries, solid-state batteries, fuel cells, and other categories are exempt until December 31, 2028. Consumption tax is a price-inclusive tax and is directly counted into costs. For China's lithium battery manufacturing segment, where margins are already thin, this is a new variable that must be absorbed; for sodium-ion batteries, however, the tax exemption window covers exactly the critical ramp-up stage from GWh-level delivery to scale-up.

The second calculation: lithium prices. According to SMM data, the SMM battery-grade lithium carbonate index fell from 159,137 yuan/mt on September 1 to 133,148 yuan/mt on September 17, a drop of about 16.3% in half a month; over the same period, the lowest spot lithium carbonate price fell from 158,000 yuan/mt to 128,000 yuan/mt, with the high-low spread widening to more than 10,000 yuan/mt at one point. Based on roughly 550 mt of lithium carbonate consumed per GWh of LFP, every 10,000 yuan/mt change in lithium prices corresponds to a change of about 5.5–6 yuan/kWh in LFP battery cell cost; this round's pullback of about 26,000 yuan/mt theoretically frees up cost space of about 14–16 yuan/kWh for LFP battery cells.

When these two calculations are considered together, the conclusion is not "stable":

  The cost dividend that consumption tax exemption gives sodium-ion batteries and the cost space that this round of lithium price declines returns to LFP (14–16 yuan/kWh) are of the same order of magnitude.

The judgment SMM wants to emphasize is this: the economics of sodium-ion batteries have never been a "sure win," but rather a race that requires continuous catching up—every step lithium prices move downward, sodium-ion batteries must rely on material cost reductions to push their cost curve down another step. This is also the fundamental reason why the plan places "low cost" ahead of "long life": the moat for sodium-ion batteries can only be dug from materials, not borrowed from policy.

III. Hard carbon is the real ceiling for sodium-ion batteries

If one looks only at policy, the path for sodium-ion batteries is already clear; but when SMM's production data are laid out, a harder constraint emerges.

First, look at growth rates. According to SMM statistics, anode growth is clearly faster than cathode growth, indicating that the localisation of hard carbon is accelerating—shifting from reliance on imported coconut shell-based raw materials toward diversified precursor routes such as bamboo-based biomass.

Next, look at unit consumption and supply. 1 GWh of sodium-ion battery requires about 1,500 mt of hard carbon anode, while global annual supply of coconut shell-based hard carbon is less than 80,000 mt. Although the plan does not single out anode materials, SMM believes that whether sodium-ion batteries can deliver on "low cost" ultimately depends on whether hard carbon can deliver on "low cost"—the slope of the hard carbon cost curve determines whether sodium-ion battery cell costs can move further down from the current level of about 0.5 yuan/Wh during 2027–2028.

The growth gap between cathode and anode also means that this year's capacity deployment is centered on the anode side. In the next stage, the most critical variable in the sodium-ion battery industry chain is not which battery cell manufacturer has signed another energy storage order, but the pace at which hard carbon unit prices move downward.

IV. The Market Has Already Voted—Polyanion Cathodes Dominate Overwhelmingly

A further breakdown of SMM's production structure reveals that the divergence in sodium-ion battery technology routes has already become very pronounced.

In August 2026, the polyanion route accounted for nearly 90% of production.

This is no accident. Polyanion cathodes (typically derivatives such as sodium vanadium phosphate and sodium iron phosphate) are clearly superior to layered oxides in terms of cycle life, wide operating temperature range, and thermal stability; layered oxides, on the other hand, offer energy density closer to that of LFP, but their shorter cycle life constrains their application in high-frequency scenarios such as energy storage. The overwhelming dominance of the polyanion route directly corresponds to the downstream choice of energy storage, rather than power batteries.

At this point, it can be stated more bluntly: the six words "low cost, long life" in the plan have, in fact, already been voted on by the market through its production structure.

Polyanion cathodes paired with hard carbon anodes are the concrete embodiment of those six words.

V. An Account No One Is Calculating Today, but Must Be Calculated After 2028

In the section on supporting industry chains, the plan proposes continuously improving the retirement and recycling system for lithium batteries and PV modules, and promoting high-value, standardized circular utilization of battery materials.

This line carries two layers of implications for sodium-ion batteries, both more far-reaching than they appear.

In the short term, it is structurally bearish. Lithium-ion batteries have been included in the scope of consumption tax for the first time, but the concurrent standardization of the recycling system will bring more stable supply of secondary lithium and secondary nickel-cobalt—in the medium term, recycled materials will gradually become the marginal variable in primary supply and influence the lithium price center through the pace of release. This is not good news for sodium-ion batteries, because their relative advantage was originally premised on lithium price uncertainty.

In the long term, it is a residual value risk. Sodium-ion batteries contain no lithium, cobalt, or nickel, and in theory are not backed by recycling value—but this also means they lack residual value protection. When the first wave of large-scale sodium-ion battery products begins to retire, residual value handling will become a cost in the full life cycle levelized cost of electricity for sodium-ion batteries that no one is calculating today but must be calculated by then. This account will ultimately fall on operators, turnkey integrators, or recycling enterprises, and it is almost never considered in current project feasibility study reports.

SMM reminds: the full life cycle cost assessment of sodium-ion batteries needs to be discussed more seriously than one-time procurement costs. This is the true meaning of the word "low cost" in the plan beyond the policy window—low cost cannot be judged solely by ex-works price; retirement costs must also be considered.

VI. SMM's View

Based on the policy text, price data, and production structure, SMM offers four judgments on the sodium-ion battery-related statements in the "15th Five-Year Plan":

First, what the policy provides is a "technology roadmap," not a "capacity target."The plan does not set installation targets for sodium-ion batteries; instead, it embeds the positioning of "low cost and long life" in its descriptive language. This means that over the next three years, the main investment focus for sodium-ion batteries will be on the materials side (hard carbon anode, polyanion cathode).

Second, "low cost" is benchmarked against the per-kWh cost of LFP. The competitor for sodium-ion batteries has never been the high-end capacity of solid-state or liquid lithium batteries, but rather the cost curve of LFP in energy storage and power applications. The wording of the plan has already made this clear.

Third, lithium prices matter in the short term, while hard carbon matters in the medium term. The marginal variable for sodium-ion batteries remains the price of lithium carbonate—it determines the strength of their relative cost advantages; the medium-term variable is the capacity and cost curve of hard carbon anode—it determines whether absolute costs can fall below those of LFP.

Fourth, the tax exemption window is not a permanent safeguard. December 31, 2028 is the deadline for the consumption tax exemption. Before that date, sodium-ion batteries must push their cost curve down to a level where they can compete independently—once the exemption is withdrawn, the structural weakness of lacking residual value support from recycling will be magnified. The real test for sodium-ion batteries lies not in the period of policy protection, but after the policy is withdrawn.

Risk warning: The pace of policy implementation, fluctuations in lithium carbonate prices, the progress of hard carbon anode capacity release, and whether the follow-up consumption tax policy will be extended may all deviate from the above judgments.

SMM New Energy Research Team

Wang Cong 021-51666838

Feng Disheng 021-51666714

Lyu Yanlin 021-20707875