On the evening of September 23 (Beijing time) / afternoon of September 23 (local time), President Xi Jinping arrived in Washington by special plane for a state visit to the United States at the invitation of President Donald Trump, with the trip scheduled through September 25. Earlier, Chinese economic and trade teams had gone to New York to participate in related talks. Within the China‑US economic agenda, rare earths and critical minerals remain one of the most closely watched themes for global supply chains.
I. Policy background: the visit and the rare earth agenda
Ahead of this Washington state visit, China‑US rare earth communication had already passed several windows. In April 2025, China imposed export controls on seven categories of medium/heavy rare earth‑related items, requiring exporters to apply for licenses as prescribed. In June, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) said it would accelerate rare earth export approvals to ease pressure on overseas supply chains.
On October 9, 2025, MOFCOM and the General Administration of Customs (GACC) issued multiple announcements covering selected overseas rare earth items, rare earth technologies, rare earth equipment and raw/auxiliary materials, and some medium/heavy rare earths such as holmium. Together these formed a full‑chain framework spanning “raw materials – technology – equipment – finished end products,” originally scheduled to take effect on November 8.
Subsequently, China and the US reached a de‑escalation arrangement during economic and trade consultations in Kuala Lumpur. On October 30, MOFCOM said it would study and refine implementation plans. On November 7, MOFCOM and GACC announced the suspension of relevant measures under 2025 notices No. 55, 56, 57, 58, 61 and 62 involving rare earths, lithium batteries and related items, with the suspension running until November 10, 2026, as a concrete step to implement the Kuala Lumpur consensus.
In April 2026, MOFCOM’s regular press conference further clarified that, based on the Kuala Lumpur consensus, the export control measures announced on October 9, 2025 are suspended until November 10, 2026, the two sides continue communication through economic and trade consultation mechanisms, and export applications that are genuinely civilian and compliant are approved in accordance with the law. On September 21, the Foreign Ministry was asked about rare earth supply and the November 10 deadline; it referred specific export‑control questions to competent authorities and reiterated China’s position of safeguarding the stability of global critical‑mineral supply chains.
II. NdFeB exports: process standardization, not a substantive halt
SMM frontline surveys show that in August–September 2026 NdFeB exports were characterized by “slower processing and tighter review” rather than a blanket stop. Authorities and compliance channels are conducting more stringent checks on end‑use, consignee identity, resale risk and military sensitivity. Customs declaration and license‑documentation cycles for some orders have lengthened, but no comprehensive ban is in place. Where the end‑user is in a civilian scenario — automotive, wind power, industrial motors, humanoid robots — and customer documents, contracts and end‑use statements are complete, license applications can still proceed.
In volume terms, China’s NdFeB exports average about 5,200 t/month. Excluding a January peak near 6,000 t, most months fall in the 4,600–5,500 t range. By region, Europe is about 44%, Asia about 39% and North America about 10%, a relatively stable structure. This indicates that although North America is policy‑sensitive, it is not the largest share of China’s total magnet exports; industrial‑motor, automotive and consumer‑electronics demand from Europe and Asia is equally critical to export prices and capacity utilization. If the Washington meeting leads to clearer mechanisms for civilian license pre‑clearance, classified whitelists and general‑license renewal, marginal export improvement in Q4 is possible — but it is more likely to appear as “more predictable approvals” than as unconditional volume expansion.
III. PrNd prices: sentiment leads, fundamentals provide the floor
Since mid‑September, light rare earths have shown PrNd leading the gains while other varieties stayed range‑bound. SMM data show that on September 22 praseodymium‑neodymium oxide rose about RMB 5,000/t in a single day and PrNd metal about RMB 7,500/t; on September 23 prices pulled back slightly but remained at recent highs. The market tends to equate “China‑US meeting expectations” directly with “a widening supply‑demand gap,” but SMM believes the current uptrend is driven more by sentiment than by across‑the‑board end‑user overbuying.
Rare earths are a strongly policy‑driven commodity with relatively high information asymmetry. Any news on China‑US consultations, export controls, total quota issuance, or import‑ore volatility is quickly translated by trading desks into pricing expectations. When downstream consumption is limited and new magnet orders have not universally surged, the industry creates new sentiment channels through the news flow: smelters hold firm on offers, traders withhold spot, magnet makers restock to need, and speculative funds position early for an “easing” outcome. This forms a short‑term chain of “news → expectation → quote → partial transactions.” It is an important marginal factor for current PrNd prices, but should not be read as a fundamentally tight physical market.
On the domestic NdFeB side, years of technology accumulation give Chinese producers clear strengths in magnetic performance, grade coverage and delivery. However, capacity has kept expanding in recent years, and some standard specifications are more oversupplied than in prior years. Intense midstream competition and compressed product spreads have not been fundamentally resolved. As traditional domestic demand grows at a slower pace, finding new NdFeB demand drivers has become necessary: EV drive motors, direct‑drive wind power and servo/humanoid robots form the medium‑to‑long‑term base, but not every segment is in “overbuying” mode in the short run. Exports therefore become a key outlet for absorbing capacity and raising high‑value orders — and because exports are affected by control details, end‑use verification, compliance documents and licensing节奏, their sensitivity to headlines is further amplified.
For this reason, the impact of the China‑US meeting on rare earth prices is better understood as a sentiment positive that “reduces policy uncertainty,” rather than a supply‑demand positive implying “sudden shortages and demand spikes.” As an independent market observer, SMM welcomes further progress in China‑US relations and believes the talks can improve expectations for compliant trade. But during news‑intensive periods, the market should avoid equating the “meeting” with a “full withdrawal of controls,” or equating a “sentiment rally” with a signal to chase prices and lock in inventory.
On policy direction, as export‑control experience accumulates and compliance review procedures mature, the regime is more likely to move toward normalized, categorized management than toward one‑size‑fits‑all restrictions. For NdFeB and magnet‑assembly orders that are genuinely civilian, have clear end‑use and traceable end‑users, compliant channels will continue to open. Orders with military end‑use, high resale risk or unclear purpose will still face strict review. Even if some control measures see changes in suspension or renewal timing, civilian NdFeB demand outside China can still be met through compliant permits, general licenses and long‑term framework agreements. Overseas companies need not panic‑stock ahead of the meeting, nor assume that approvals will automatically return to 2024‑style efficiency after November 10.
IV. Conclusion
Overall, the Q4 PrNd price center is supported by “policy expectations + relatively low mine operating rates + low inventories + partial restocking,” but its upside is capped by oversupply in some NdFeB specifications, overseas substitution, inventory adjustment and the speed at which end‑user orders are actually fulfilled. SMM’s view is that the market should treat sentiment as a trading rhythm and treat compliance plus end‑demand as the real pricing base: meeting expectations may generate impulse rallies, but only when orders from new energy, wind power and robotics move from inquiries to signed contracts will the price gain have fundamental inertia. Rational analysis of supply and demand, decisions based on real corporate consumption, and avoidance of herd behavior remain the most prudent approach.
![Scrap Pr-Nd moved sideways, pre-holiday stockpiling rose first then fell [SMM Recycled Rare Earth Weekly Review]](https://imgqn.smm.cn/usercenter/rqOXm20251217171744.jpeg)
![Pr-Nd edges up with few firm orders, medium-heavy rare earth generally weak [SMM Rare Earth Weekly Review]](https://imgqn.smm.cn/usercenter/ecUwF20251217171745.jpg)