Geopolitics Reshapes Energy Order: New Energy Is No Longer Just a Transition Narrative but a National Security Asset

Published: Mar 2, 2026 10:42

In times of peace, oil and gas are cost variables; in a war context, traditional energy becomes a security variable.

The escalation of conflict in the Middle East at the end of February led to a high opening for oil prices on the first trading day of March. During peacetime, energy prices fluctuate around the supply-demand gap, with the market focusing on production, inventory, and cost curves. However, in a war environment, the market first trades not on production but on deliverability. Whether key shipping routes are open, whether insurance costs soar, and whether sanctions spread, all quickly translate into risk premiums. As a result, oil prices exhibit high fluctuations, even if actual supply has not significantly decreased, as prices are pushed up by delivery uncertainties. Energy thus transforms from a commodity into a strategic resource.

As an analyst in the new energy sector, I believe that this change does not simply benefit new energy. Rising oil prices reinforce the logic of electrification, making EVs and renewable energy more economically attractive. However, the macroeconomic uncertainty brought about by war may also dampen consumer and investment confidence. If high oil prices drive inflation and slow growth, overall demand for cars and industry will slow down, and new energy will not be immune. Therefore, the investment logic for new energy is no longer unidirectional, but depends on the balance between substitution effects and macroeconomic contraction effects.

A deeper change lies in the fact that capital is beginning to re-evaluate energy security. The traditional oil and gas system is highly dependent on cross-border transportation and continuous fuel supply, with its vulnerabilities lying in shipping and geopolitics. In contrast, wind and PV do not require continuous fuel input during operation, and energy storage can enhance the stability of the power system, giving new energy strategic value in a war environment. They are not only low-carbon tools but also a path to reducing external dependence. The security attributes of new energy are thus being revalued.

However, it must be recognized that this security attribute is not absolute. The manufacturing of new energy is highly dependent on critical minerals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt, with their mining and processing concentrated and heavily reliant on transportation. If upstream resource policies tighten or logistics are disrupted, risks will also propagate through the industry chain. Therefore, the security of new energy is operational security, not supply security. This means that future investment logic will shift from simply pursuing the lowest cost to focusing on supply chain control capabilities and regional diversification.

In a war environment, the allocation of risk premiums by capital changes. Transportation premiums, geopolitical premiums, and supply chain concentration premiums all rise. The volatility of traditional energy intensifies; new energy generation assets gain a security bonus; and critical minerals and midstream processing capabilities become new strategic nodes. Efficiency is no longer the sole criterion, with redundancy and controllability becoming important components of the valuation system. Deglobalization and supply chain restructuring may push up the cost center of the industry, but they also enhance the strategic position of assets.

In this context, the value of energy storage and power grid assets stands out. If conflicts persist, the core goal of the energy system will shift from cost optimization to system resilience. Distributed energy, microgrids, and energy storage have insurance-like attributes, and their value becomes more evident in extreme scenarios. Even if high raw material prices increase project costs, an elevated policy priority may still provide long-term support.

Over the past five to ten years, the narrative of the energy transition has largely focused on new energy as a tool for decarbonization to ensure sustainable development of the planet. However, geopolitical tensions in the last two to three years have redefined new energy as part of the energy security framework. Within new energy, it is not just the power generation assets that are being repriced, but also energy storage and the power grid.

1) In a war environment, the core issue of the energy system shifts from efficiency to resilience

During peacetime, the goal of the energy system is to maximize efficiency: lowest cost, highest utilization rate, and optimal allocation. Cross-border trade and centralized power generation have made the global energy structure highly globalized and scaled.

War exposes the vulnerabilities of such a system. Maritime transport routes, natural gas pipelines, tanker insurance, key ports, and large power plants can all become risk nodes. At this point, the system's priority is no longer efficiency but resilience – the ability to maintain basic operational capacity under shocks.

Energy storage and the power grid are at the core of a resilient system.

2) Energy storage: from an arbitrage tool to system insurance

In normal circumstances, the value of energy storage mainly comes from electricity arbitrage, ancillary services, and peak load regulation, with its return on investment depending on fluctuations in electricity prices and policy subsidies.

However, in a wartime context, the value of energy storage is redefined. It is no longer merely an economic optimization tool but a guarantee of power system stability. Energy storage can provide emergency support during fuel supply disruptions or grid shocks, preventing the power system from collapsing due to a single point of failure.

This means that energy storage assets have insurance-like attributes. When system risks rise, capital's risk appetite for these assets increases. Even if high raw material prices drive up project costs, there may still be stronger policy support because of the rising strategic value.

The valuation logic of energy storage thus transitions from "IRR-driven" to "system safety premium."

3) Power grid: an undervalued strategic hub

The impact of war on the energy system often first manifests in the transmission and distribution network. Centralized energy structures rely on a few key periods, and once damaged, the impact is widespread.

Therefore, power grid upgrades and digitalization have become the focus of secure investments. Enhancements in smart grids, regional interconnections, grid redundancy, and distributed access capabilities can significantly strengthen the system's resilience to shocks.

The investment logic for power grid assets becomes clearer in a wartime context: it is not only infrastructure but also the backbone of national energy security.

In the long term, power grid upgrades will be a necessary prerequisite for the expansion of new energy. The fluctuations in new energy generation require more robust transmission, distribution, and dispatching capabilities. When risk environments rise, countries are more inclined to accelerate grid construction to reduce dependence on external energy.

4) Distributed Energy and Microgrids: The Strategic Significance of Decentralization

While centralized energy systems are efficient, they are also highly vulnerable. Although distributed PV, community energy storage, and microgrids are relatively small in scale, they possess the capability for independent operation. In a war context, distributed energy has two advantages: first, it reduces the risk of single-point failures; second, it decreases reliance on cross-border fuel transportation.

The strategic value of such assets is being re-evaluated in high-risk environments.

5) Deep Changes in Investment Logic

The rising value of energy storage and power grids means that new energy investments no longer solely revolve around installation growth and cost reduction, but rather around system security and supply chain control.

Key changes include:

a. Capital is more focused on localized manufacturing and supply chain diversification;

b. The weight of security in investment decisions has increased;

c. The cost center may shift upward in stages, but the strategic premium has risen.

The valuation system of the new energy industry is transitioning from a growth premium to a strategic premium.


What opportunities and risks does geopolitics bring to China's new energy industry?

1) China's Energy Security Structure: From Import Dependence to Electrification Advantage

China has long been one of the world's largest crude oil importers, with persistent energy security issues. In a wartime environment, oil price fluctuations and transportation risks increase, directly affecting energy costs and macro expectations.

However, unlike before, China has established the most complete new energy manufacturing system globally. The high integration of the PV, wind, energy storage, battery, and EV industry chains gives China a manufacturing and scale advantage during the energy transition.

In a war context, this advantage is beginning to translate into security attributes: an increase in electrification means a reduction in dependence on external fuels; an increase in new energy installations means a more resilient energy structure.

Thus, China's new energy system has the potential for alternative security.

2) Energy Storage and Power Grid: China's Most Strategic Assets

If the war becomes protracted, the core of the energy system will no longer be power generation capacity itself, but system stability. China's layout in energy storage and power grid gives it a relative advantage at this stage. In terms of energy storage, China possesses the world's largest battery manufacturing capacity and cost advantages. Under the logic of energy security, energy storage is no longer solely about economics, but has become an important tool for ensuring the stability and emergency response capability of the power system. At the policy level, there may be an emphasis on increasing the proportion of energy storage in the power system.

Regarding the power grid, China has developed the world's largest ultra-high voltage transmission network and grid construction capabilities. The increased redundancy and interconnectivity of the grid help to absorb more new energy installations while enhancing the system's resilience against shocks. In a high-risk environment, investment in the grid may accelerate.

This means that, under the security logic, China's energy storage and power grid assets have structural strategic premiums.

3) Critical Minerals and Supply Chain: Advantages and Risks Coexist

China has advantages in the new energy manufacturing sector, but still relies on overseas layouts for upstream resources. The supply chains for critical minerals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt are highly internationalized, and wars or geopolitical risks may amplify policy and logistics uncertainties.

For China's new energy industry chain, the real challenge lies not in the manufacturing end, but in the stability and cost fluctuations of the resource end. The trend of supply chain deglobalization may push up the cost center, compressing profit margins.

The core of future competition will shift from scale expansion to resource control capabilities and the diversification of global layouts.

4) New Energy Vehicles: China's Structural Advantages and Short-term Fluctuations

The impact of the war environment on new energy vehicles also has a dual nature.

On one hand, rising oil prices reinforce the economic advantages of EVs. In a context of high oil prices, the cost advantages of using EVs become even more evident, which is conducive to increasing the penetration rate among end-users. China has the world's largest EV capacity and supply chain system, with scale and cost advantages.

On the other hand, high oil prices may suppress consumer confidence through inflation and macroeconomic uncertainty. If the war continues for a long time, global economic growth may slow down, putting overall car demand under pressure. Although new energy vehicles have a substitution logic, they cannot be completely independent of the macro cycle.

Therefore, the short-term performance of China's new energy vehicle industry will depend on the relative strength of the substitution effect and macroeconomic drag.

5) Long-term Structure: Re-stratification of Strategic Assets

In the era of energy security, the competitiveness of China's new energy system will be more reflected in three aspects:

First, manufacturing scale and cost control capabilities;

Second, the system support capacity of the power grid and energy storage;

Third, the diversification of upstream resources and supply chain layout.

War has accelerated the stratification of the global energy system. Traditional energy bears higher fluctuation risks; new energy power generation and power grid assets gain a safety premium; critical minerals become the focal point of geopolitical competition.

For China, the new energy industry is no longer just an engine for growth but also a part of the energy security system. The investment logic will shift from pure growth rate and subsidies to strategic position and supply chain stability.

Overall, as energy transitions from a cost variable to a security variable, the strategic value of China's new energy system rises, but it also faces higher supply chain risks and global competitive pressures. Energy storage and the power grid are becoming the core of system stability; new energy vehicles benefit under the substitution logic, but one must be wary of macro cycles; critical minerals will determine the cost center and industrial profit margins.

In an era where war reshapes the energy order, stability is more important than growth.

SMM New Energy Analyst Yang Le 13916526348

Data Source Statement: Except for publicly available information, all other data are processed by SMM based on publicly available information, market communication, and relying on SMM's internal database model. They are for reference only and do not constitute decision-making recommendations.

For any inquiries or for more information, please contact: lemonzhao@smm.cn
For more information on how to access our research reports, please contact:service.en@smm.cn
Related News
[SMM Flash] Zimbabwean Spodumene Concentrate Prices Fall Across All Grades, Led by 5% Li₂O Down 1.99%
9 hours ago
[SMM Flash] Zimbabwean Spodumene Concentrate Prices Fall Across All Grades, Led by 5% Li₂O Down 1.99%
Read More
[SMM Flash] Zimbabwean Spodumene Concentrate Prices Fall Across All Grades, Led by 5% Li₂O Down 1.99%
[SMM Flash] Zimbabwean Spodumene Concentrate Prices Fall Across All Grades, Led by 5% Li₂O Down 1.99%
Zimbabwean spodumene concentrate prices, CIF Chinese main ports, declined across all three tracked grades on August 7, with the lower-grade material posting the steepest percentage drop. The 6% Li₂O grade (SMM-Li-SC-005) settled at $2,010/tonne, down $25 (-1.23%), trading in a $1,970-$2,050 range. The 5.5% Li₂O grade (SMM-Li-SC-006) closed at $1,885/tonne, down $30 (-1.57%), within a $1,860-$1,910 band. The 5% Li₂O grade (SMM-Li-SC-007) fell hardest, settling at $1,725/tonne, down $35 (-1.99%), with the widest daily range of the three at $1,660-$1,790. The pullback widened the grade differential at the lower end of the curve: the 6%-5.5% spread stood at $125/tonne, while the 5.5%-5% spread widened to $160/tonne, up from typical spread levels, pointing to comparatively softer demand for lower-grade Zimbabwean material relative to higher-Li₂O concentrate on the day. SMM View: The broad-based decline across all three Zimbabwean spodumene grades tracks the wider softness in China's lithium chemical complex, with lower-grade material bearing the brunt of the pullback as buyers favour higher-grade feedstock amid cautious purchasing. SMM will continue to monitor whether the widening 5.5%-5% spread persists into the next pricing session or reflects a single-day liquidity effect.
9 hours ago
[SMM Analysis] Corica Mali Wins $348M Open-Pit Mining Contract at Ganfeng's Goulamina Lithium Project
9 hours ago
[SMM Analysis] Corica Mali Wins $348M Open-Pit Mining Contract at Ganfeng's Goulamina Lithium Project
Read More
[SMM Analysis] Corica Mali Wins $348M Open-Pit Mining Contract at Ganfeng's Goulamina Lithium Project
[SMM Analysis] Corica Mali Wins $348M Open-Pit Mining Contract at Ganfeng's Goulamina Lithium Project
Corica Mali, a subsidiary of Corica Mining Services, has been awarded the open-pit mining services contract at the Goulamina spodumene project in Mali, valued at approximately $348 million. The contract follows a competitive tender process and covers six months of pre-production activity followed by a fixed five-year term. Corica has already mobilised to site under an early works arrangement and is currently carrying out pre-strip and direct shipped ore (DSO) mining and crushing. Scope covers grade control, drill and blast, load and haul, and plant ore-feed services, with a planned material movement target of 18-20 Mt/y over the contract term. This figure refers to total mined material (ore plus waste), distinct from finished spodumene concentrate output Goulamina's Stage 1 definitive feasibility study outlines nameplate production of roughly 506,000 tonnes per annum of 6% Li₂O spodumene concentrate (SC6), with test work validating high-quality, low mica concentrate. On logistics, Goulamina is landlocked, located roughly 50 km west of Bougouni in southern Mali, and spodumene concentrate produced at site is trucked overland to coastal ports for onward shipment to end markets, predominantly Chinese converters. Industry practice for landlocked West African spodumene projects is to sell concentrate on an FOB basis at the export port, with the buyer arranging and bearing ocean freight from that point; Mali-origin concentrate has historically moved primarily via Abidjan, with San Pedro and Dakar available as secondary corridors. Specific Incoterms and export routing for Goulamina's commercial shipments were not disclosed in the contract announcement and should be confirmed against offtake documentation rather than assumed. Goulamina holds all key approvals and permits required for production. Ownership has changed since the original mining contract announcement: Ganfeng Lithium, previously a 50% joint-venture partner, acquired the remaining 40% interest from Leo Lithium in a transaction completed through 2024-2025, and now holds the project alongside the Government of Mali's equity interest under the country's revised mining code terms of the state's current stake should be verified against the latest Malian government disclosure rather than the original 10% free-carry figure cited at contract signing. First commercial shipment from Goulamina occurred in August 2025, superseding the original H1 2024 production target referenced when this contract was first announced. Corica has operated in the West African mining services sector for over 20 years and reports more than 2,000 employees, according to company-supplied figures; these have not been independently verified by SMM. SMM View: The Corica contract underlines the scale of open-pit mining services demand accompanying Mali's ramp-up as a spodumene supply source, with an 18-20 Mt/y material movement target supporting Goulamina's roughly 506,000 tpa SC6 nameplate capacity. With Ganfeng now holding full private ownership following its 2024-2025 buyout of Leo Lithium's stake, offtake and logistics decisions at Goulamina sit entirely with Ganfeng and the Malian state, reinforcing China's direct control over a growing share of West African spodumene supply reaching Chinese conversion capacity. SMM will monitor further disclosure on Goulamina's export routing and contractual Incoterms as shipment volumes scale.
9 hours ago
[SMM Analysis] Zimbabwe Lithium Producers Commit $1.45B to Local Processing, Seek Export Ban Flexibility"
9 hours ago
[SMM Analysis] Zimbabwe Lithium Producers Commit $1.45B to Local Processing, Seek Export Ban Flexibility"
Read More
[SMM Analysis] Zimbabwe Lithium Producers Commit $1.45B to Local Processing, Seek Export Ban Flexibility"
[SMM Analysis] Zimbabwe Lithium Producers Commit $1.45B to Local Processing, Seek Export Ban Flexibility"
Zimbabwe's lithium producers have collectively committed approximately US$1.45 billion to local beneficiation infrastructure, according to Lithium Producers Association Chairman Innocent Rukweza, who also heads Mutapa Energy Resources. Speaking at the Mine Entra Beneficiation and Value Addition Symposium in Bulawayo, Rukweza said the industry has sought government flexibility on the pending export restriction on unbeneficiated spodumene concentrate, citing limited sulphate-plant readiness across the sector. SMM notes the ban's effective date and any adjustment to it should be confirmed against the latest government notice rather than symposium commentary, and that the US$1.45 billion figure is association-reported and has not been independently verified. Of seven major producers, only the Huayou-linked plant at Prospect Lithium Zimbabwe's Arcadia site has completed and commissioned sulphate conversion capacity to date. The US$400 million facility exported Africa's first locally produced lithium sulphate in April 2026 and is now operating. Sinomine's US$500 million sulphate plant at Bikita remains under construction, Kamativi Mining Company's US$200 million-plus sulphate project is at investment stage with commissioning status unconfirmed, and a fourth, unnamed facility is targeted for end-2027. The gap between committed capital and commissioned output is the operative supply constraint behind the industry's request for timeline flexibility: the remaining producers are still moving concentrate rather than sulphate and would be directly exposed if the unbeneficiated export restriction takes effect before their plants come online. Logistics add a further layer of risk to that timeline. Spodumene concentrate is currently exported CIF China, routed predominantly via Beira in Mozambique and Durban in South Africa, and sulphate output from commissioned and future plants will likely need to move through the same corridors absent dedicated arrangements. ZETDC grid instability continues to affect processing-plant uptime, bearing directly on how quickly the remaining sulphate facilities can ramp to nameplate capacity once commissioned, while congestion at the Machipanda border post and along the Beitbridge Durban and Maputo rail corridors affects turnaround times independent of on-site production readiness. Even where sulphate capacity comes online on schedule, these constraints will shape whether the sector can convert commissioned capacity into consistent export volumes ahead of any tightened concentrate-export policy. On the fiscal side, the industry's effective tax burden is estimated at around 40% of sales revenue, comprising a 10% export tax on unbeneficiated lithium, 7% royalties, a 3% community development levy, a 1% MMCZ marketing fee and 15.5% VAT, before corporate income tax, payroll and foreign currency retention requirements are added. The association has called for a review, noting Zimbabwe's rate sits above global peers. Beyond lithium, the association has pointed to unrecovered value in tantalum, niobium and caesium from lithium operations, and government has since introduced mandatory mineral declaration and on-site assay laboratory requirements at producing mines. Specific loss and investment figures cited for this by-product stream were not independently attributed at the symposium and are not carried here pending primary sourcing. SMM View: Zimbabwe's beneficiation drive is currently a one-plant story, with Arcadia commissioned and exporting sulphate while Bikita, Kamativi and the fourth facility remain at construction or investment stage. The binding constraints on closing that gap are not purely financial grid reliability and corridor congestion at Machipanda and along the Beitbridge–Durban and Maputo routes will shape how quickly commissioned capacity converts into consistent export volumes. The roughly 40% effective tax burden remains a separate and likely more durable point of friction with Harare. SMM will confirm the committed investment figure and current export-policy status once further primary disclosures are available.
9 hours ago
Geopolitics Reshapes Energy Order: New Energy Is No Longer Just a Transition Narrative but a National Security Asset - Shanghai Metals Market (SMM)